DATE 6/20/2023
FBI INFO. CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG/ [redacted]
REASON: 1.4(C)
DECLASSIFY ON 12/31/2028
b6-1 per FBI
b7C-1 per FBI

[redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

From: [redacted] (DO) (FBI) [redacted]
Sent: Friday, June 25, 2021 11:58 AM
To: Avril D. Haines-DNI- b3 per ODNI, b3 per CIA; b6-1 per FBI, b6 per ODNI, b6 per CIA; b7C-1 per FBI; b7E-3 per FBI
Cc: Wray Christopher FBI USA GOV; Abbate Paul FBI USA GOV; Sallet Jeffrey FBI USA GOV; Vorndran Bryan FBI USA GOV; UGORETZ TONYA FBI USA GOV; Corsi Dina FBI USA GOV; [redacted] (KC) (FBI); [redacted] FBI USA GOV; Sanborn Jill FBI USA GOV; Knapp Larissa FBI USA GOV; Turner Brian FBI USA GOV; Young Ryan FBI USA GOV; Jones Darrin FBI USA GOV; [redacted] FBI USA GOV; Cohen Brian FBI USA GOV; [redacted] FBI USA GOV; [redacted] FBI USA GOV; [redacted] FBI USA GOV; Butler Cassandra FBI USA GOV; williams justin FBI USA GOV; Kern Julie FBI USA GOV; [redacted] FBI USA GOV; [redacted] FBI USA GOV; [redacted] FBI USA GOV;
[redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) [redacted]
Subject: FBI update through June 25th --- ~~TOP SECRET//SI-G//ORCON/NOFORN//LES~~
Attachments: [redacted]

Classification: ~~TOP SECRET//SI-G//ORCON/NOFORN//LES~~ (U)

Classified By: [redacted] b6-1 per FBI b7C-1 per FBI
Derived From: FBI NSICG
Declassify On: 50X1-HUM
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Director Haines,

(U) Please see our update below, which summarizes FBI operational and intelligence activities during the past week. Please let me know if you have any questions or would like additional information about any of these items.

Respectfully,

[redacted]

(U) FBI OPERATIONAL UPDATES:

b3-5 per FBI; b6-1,4 per FBI; b7C-1 ,4 per FBI

- (U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] *BI and DHS, Joint Intelligence Bulletin)* b3-5 per FBI b6-4 per FBI b7C-4 per FBI
- (U//~~LES~~) [redacted] *(FBI Counterterrorism Division)*

(U) FBI-GENERATED INTELLIGENCE:

- (U//~~FOUO~~) In a June 21 Emerging Intelligence Report, our Criminal Investigative Division and Chicago Field Office assessed sex traffickers very likely exploit Onlyfans.com to recruit, advertise, and sell adult victims' sexual abuse content, facilitating

victimization throughout the United States. Within the next 12 to 18 months, the FBI judges sex traffickers very likely will increase exploitation of the Onlyfans.com online platform to sell adult content, due to its ease of connecting with buyers who do not need to make physical contact, leading to increased adult victimization. *(FBI Criminal Investigative Division and FBI Chicago)*

- (U//~~FOUO~~) In a June 21 Emerging Intelligence Report, our Omaha Field Office, Columbia Field Office, and Criminal Investigative Division assessed [redacted] *(FBI Omaha, FBI Columbia, and FBI Criminal Investigative Division)* b3-5 per FBI b7E-4,8 per FBI b1-1 per FBI b3-5 per FBI b7E-4,8 per FBI

- (~~S//NF~~) [redacted] *FBI Foreign Influence Task Force and FBI Philadelphia)*

- (U) (~~S//NF~~) [redacted] *(FBI Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate)* b1-1 per FBI b3-5 per FBI b7E-4,8 per FBI

(U) IC COOPERATION/FBI PARTNER ENGAGEMENT

- (U) (~~S//NF~~) [redacted] *(FBI Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate)* b1-1 per FBI b3-5 per FBI b7E-4,8 per FBI

- (U) From June 22 to 26, our Office of Partner Engagement attended the following law enforcement engagements:
- (U) June 22–26: National Sheriffs Association Summer Conference in Phoenix, Arizona.
- (U) June 23–25, International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators virtual Annual Conference and Exposition.
- (U) June 25, National Academy Youth Day Active Shooter Training Demo in Quantico, Virginia. *(FBI Office of Partner Engagement)*

(U) FBI CYBER ACTIVITIES:

(U) Nation-State Cyber Threats:

(U) b1-1 per FBI; b3-5 per FBI; b7E-4,8 per FBI

- (~~S//NF~~) [redacted] *(FBI Cyber Division)*

b1-1 per FBI; b3-5 per FBI; b7E-4,8 per FBI

- (~~TS//SI//OC/NF~~ [redacted] *(FBI Cyber Division and FBI Counterintelligence Division)*

b1-1 per FBI; b3-5 per FBI; b7E-4,8 per FBI

- (~~TS//SI//N~~ [redacted] *(FBI Cyber Division and FBI Atlanta)*

(U) Sharing Cyber Threat Information with the Private Sector and the Public:

- (U) On June 15, our Cyber Division Deputy Assistant Director Tonya Ugoretz delivered a keynote address for CyberScoop's virtual 2021 CyberTalks. In her speech, "The FBI Cyber Strategy at the Nine-Month Mark: Impact and Opportunities," DAD Ugoretz outlined examples of how the FBI Cyber Strategy has looked in practice. The new strategy announced in September is focused on imposing risk and consequences on our cyber adversaries and DAD Ugoretz highlighted some FBI actions in recent months involving SolarWinds attribution, the webshell removal operation involving computers impacted by the GoldBeetle (HAFNIUM) campaign, and the Emotet infrastructure takedown as examples of using FBI's unique combination of domestic law enforcement and intelligence authorities to enable joint, sequenced operations with U.S. and international partners for maximum impact. She also emphasized the importance of public and private sectors working together in the fight against cyber threats to the annual gathering consisting of chief information security officers and cyber leaders. *(FBI Cyber Division)*

(U) Nonstate Actors and Cyber Crime:

- (U//~~FOUO~~) On June 14, the FBI published the attached Technical Analysis Bulletin (TAB) which assesses [redacted] *(FBI Cyber Division and FBI Milwaukee)*
- (U//~~FOUO~~) On June 17, our Cyber Division disseminated a Homeland Intelligence Brief (HIB) Operational Update to provide details about [redacted] *(FBI Cyber Division)*

b6-4 per FBI
b7C-4 per FBI
b7E-3 per FBI

[redacted]
FBI - Intelligence Branch
[redacted] (Unclass)
[redacted] (Office)

b6-1 per FBI
b7C-1 per FBI
b7E-3,4 per FBI

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Classification: ~~TOP SECRET//SI-G//ORCON/NOFORN//LES~~

DATE 6/20/2023
FBI INFO. CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG/ [redacted]
REASON: 1.4(C)
DECLASSIFY ON 12/31/2023

b6-1 per FBI
b7C-1 per FBI

[redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

From: [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, June 21, 2021 02:26 PM
To: [redacted] (b)(3)
Subject: FW: FBI update through June 18th
Attachments: PIN_Cyber_Actors_Impersonating_Construction_Companies_2021-06-09.pdf; [redacted] (b)(1), (b)(3) [redacted]
Signed By: [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

b1-1per FBI
b1 per ODNI,
b1 per CIA
b3-5 per FBI
b3per ODNI
b3 per CIA
b6-1 per FBI
b6 per ODNI
b7C-1 per FBI
b7E-4,5 ,8 per FBI

Classification: ~~TOP SECRET//[redacted]SI-G//FGI NLD//ORCON/NOFORN[redacted]~~

Classified By: [redacted]
Derived From: FBI NSICG
Declassify On: 50X1-HUM
==========

b3 per ODNI, per CIA
b6-1 per FBI
b6 per ODNI, per CIA
b7C-1 per FBI
b7E-3 per FBI

From: [redacted] (DO) (FBI) [redacted]>
Sent: Thursday, June 17, 2021 6:15 PM
To: Avril D. Haines-DNI [redacted] (b)(3)
Cc: Wray Christopher FBI USA GOV [redacted]; Abbate Paul FBI USA GOV [redacted]; Sallet Jeffrey FBI USA GOV [redacted] v>; Vorndran Bryan FBI USA GOV [redacted]>; UGORETZ TONYA FBI USA GOV [redacted]; Corsi Dina FBI USA GOV [redacted] (KC) (FBI) [redacted]>; [redacted] FBI USA GOV [redacted]>; Sanborn Jill FBI USA GOV [redacted]>; Knapp Larissa FBI USA GOV [redacted]>; Turner Brian FBI USA GOV [redacted]>; Young Ryan FBI USA GOV [redacted]; Jones Darrin FBI USA GOV [redacted] FBI USA GOV [redacted]; Cohen Brian FBI USA GOV [redacted]>; Gavin Michael FBI USA GOV [redacted]>; [redacted] FBI USA GOV [redacted] FBI USA GOV [redacted]; Butler Cassandra FBI USA GOV [redacted]>; williams justin FBI USA GOV [redacted]; Kern Julie FBI USA GOV [redacted]>; [redacted] FBI USA GOV [redacted] FBI USA GOV [redacted] FBI USA GOV [redacted]>;
[redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) [redacted]
Subject: FBI update through June 18th --- ~~TOP SECRET//[redacted]/SI-G//FGI NLD//ORCON/NOFORN/[redacted]~~

b1-1 per FBI
b3-5 per FBI
b3 per CIA
b7E-4,8 per FBI

Classification: ~~TOP SECRET//[redacted]SI-G//FGI NLD//ORCON/NOFORN[redacted]~~

Classified By: [redacted]
Derived From: FBI NSICG
Declassify On: 50X1-HUM
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b6-1 per FBI
b7C-1 per FBI

Director Haines,

(U) Please see our update below, which summarizes FBI operational and intelligence activities during the past week. Please let me know if you have any questions or would like additional information about any of these items.

Respectfully,

[redacted]

b6-1 per FBI
b7C-1 per FBI

(U) FBI OPERATIONAL UPDATES:

b6-4 per FBI
b7C-4 per FBI

- (U) On June 8, our Birmingham Field Office's Special Weapons and Tactics team arrested [redacted] on the charge of [redacted] was captured on video [redacted]. FBI Birmingham opened a full investigation on [redacted] predicated on information that [redacted] entered the Capitol and assaulted federal officers during the breach of the building. [redacted] was positively identified through open source and witness identification. Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Police Department officers detained [redacted] on Capitol grounds based on [redacted] was not charged with possession of a prohibited weapon due to no evidence that he intended to use the weapon to harm demonstrations or officers. *(FBI Counterterrorism Division)*

- (U) On June 10, the FBI, Dallas Police Department, ATF, and DEA arrested 10 drug dealers as part of "Operation '50/50 Love.' The effort, which occurred in Dallas, involved more than 400 agents and resulted in the seizure of 36 weapons, more than $58,000 in cash, six vehicles, and more than 18 kilograms of drugs. *(DOJ Press Release)*

- (U) On June 10, the FBI participated in a multinational operation to disrupt and take down the infrastructure of an online marketplace, known as Slilpp. Since 2012, the Slilpp marketplace has been selling stolen login credentials, including usernames and passwords for bank accounts, online payment accounts, mobile phone accounts, and retailer accounts. The Slilpp marketplace allowed vendors to sell, and customers to buy, stolen login credentials by providing the forum and payment mechanism for such transactions. Slilpp buyers subsequently used those login credentials to conduct unauthorized transactions from the related accounts. The FBI worked in coordination with foreign LE partners to identify a series of servers that hosted the Slilpp marketplace's infrastructure and its various domain names. *(DOJ Press Release)*

- (U) From June 7 to 11, in Little Rock, Arkansas, the FBI and a coalition of LE partners conducted "Operation Ceasefire" resulting in the arrest of 61 of the area's most wanted individuals. The U.S. Marshals Service, Little Rock Police Department, and our Gang Enforcement Task Force—known as GETROCK—combined their resources to identify, locate, and arrest 61 wanted individuals in the Little Rock area. Those arrested were wanted for crimes, including capital murder, rape, aggravated assault battery, terroristic act, and various drug and other charges. Statistics collected by the Little Rock Police Department indicated that violent crime has increased 16 percent from 2020 to 2021. The arrests were part of a continued effort to combat violent crime in the Little Rock area. *(DOJ Press Release)*

b1-1 per FBI; b3-5 per FBI; b6-4 , b7C-4 per FBI; b7E-4,8,14 per FBI

- (U) (~~S//NF~~) [redacted] *(FBI Counterterrorism Division)*

(U) FBI-GENERATED INTELLIGENCE:

- (U//~~FOUO~~) In a June 14 Executive Content: Information Report, our Criminal Investigative Division, Miami Field Office, and Critical Incident Response Group found more than 50 percent of online crimes against children (CAC) actors express a behavioral indicator of intent to commit suicide or murder-suicide if apprehended by LE rather than surrender to LE without incident, [redacted] As a result of the February 2 agent-involved shooting that led to the deaths of two FBI Miami CAC special agents and wounding of four other LE officers, our

b7E-4 per FBI

Criminal Investigative Division and FBI Miami collected intelligence on potential operational and safety concerns to LE posed by CAC offenders. [redacted] *(FBI Criminal Investigative Division, FBI Miami, with contributions from FBI Critical Incident Response Group)*

b1-1 per FBI; b3-5 per FBI; b7E-4,8 per FBI

- (U) (~~TS//SI//OC/NF~~) [redacted] *FBI Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate)*

(U) IC COOPERATION/FBI PARTNER ENGAGEMENT

b1-1 per FBI; b3-5 per FBI, b3 per ODNI; b6-1 per FBI, b6 per ODNI; b7C-1 per FBI; b7E-4,8 per FBI

- (U) (~~S//NF~~) [redacted] *(FBI Bureau Intelligence Council)*

b1-1 per FBI; b3-5 per FBI; b7E-4,5,13 per FBI

- (~~S//REL TO USA~~ [redacted] *(FBI Bureau Intelligence Council)*
- (U) From June 14 to 17, our Office of Partner Engagement participated in the Major Sheriffs of America Summer Conference in Asheville, North Carolina. On June 15, Director Wray served as the keynote speaker for the event. *(FBI Office of Partner Engagement)*

(U) DOMESTIC DNI REPRESENTATIVE PROGRAM:

- (U//~~FOUO~~) On June 8, the Domestic Director of National Intelligence Representative (DDNIR) Program's New England Region held its third-quarter meeting virtually from our Boston Field Office. The meeting's agenda included a briefing on the NIC's Strategic Futures Group's recently published paper, titled "Global Trends 2040." *(FBI Office of Partner Engagement)*

b1-1 per FBI; b3-5 per FBI b7E-4,8 per FBI

- (U) (~~S//NF~~) [redacted] *(FBI Office of Partner Engagement)*

(U) FBI CYBER ACTIVITIES:

(U) Nation-State Cyber Threats:

- [redacted]

b1-1 per FBI, per CIA; b3-5 per FBI, b3 per CIA; b7E-4,8,14 per FBI

b1-1 per FBI, b1 per ODNI, b1 per CIA; b3-5 per FBI, b3 per ODNI, b3 per CIA; b7E-4,8,14

- (U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] *(FBI Cyber Division, [redacted])*

b1-1 per FBI; b3-5 per FBI; b7E-4,8,14 per FBI

- (U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] *FBI Cyber Division, with contributions from FBI Counterintelligence Division)*

(U) Sharing Cyber Threat Information with the Private Sector and the Public:

- (U) On June 9, our Cyber Division issued the attached Private Industry Notification (PIN) to warn about cyber actors impersonating construction companies to conduct business email compromises. With 700,000 construction companies in the United States earning approximately $1.9 trillion in annual revenue, construction companies are a lucrative target for cyber actors. This is especially so when cyber actors discover through open sources which companies work on the largest projects across the country, and then target those companies by sending spoofed emails and other fraudulent methods to exploit these companies. The PIN provides examples of recent activity against several entities across multiple critical infrastructure sectors and recommendations for mitigation. *(FBI Cyber Division and Richmond Field Office)*

[redacted]
FBI - Intelligence Branch
[redacted]
[redacted] (Unclass)
[redacted] (Office)

b6-1 per FBI
b7C-1 per FBI
b7E-3 per FBI

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Classification: ~~TOP SECRET//[redacted]/SI-G//FGI NLD//ORCON/NOFORN/[redacted]~~

b1-1 per FBI
b3-5 per FBI
b3 per CIA
b7E-4,8 per FBI

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Classification: ~~TOP SECRET//[redacted]/SI-G//FGI NLD//ORCON/NOFORN/[redacted]~~

b1-1 per FBI
b3-5 per FBI
b3 per CIA
b7E-4,8 per FBI

DATE 6/20/2023
FBI INFO CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG/ [redacted] b6-1 per FBI
REASON: 1.4(C) b7C-1 per FBI
DECLASSIFY ON 12/31/2023

[redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

From: [redacted] (DO) (FBI) [redacted] >
Sent: Friday, July 30, 2021 09:44 AM
To: Avril D. Haines-DNI- b1 per CIA; b3 per ODNI, b3 per CIA; b6-1 per FBI, b6 per ODNI, b6 per CIA; b7c-1 per FBI; b7E-3 per FBI
Cc: Wray Christopher FBI USA GOV; Abbate Paul FBI USA GOV; Sallet Jeffrey FBI USA GOV; Vorndran Bryan FBI USA GOV; UGORETZ TONYA FBI USA GOV; Corsi Dina FBI USA GOV; [redacted] FBI USA GOV; [redacted] FBI USA GOV; Sanborn Jill FBI USA GOV; Knapp Larissa FBI USA GOV; Turner Brian FBI USA GOV; Young Ryan FBI USA GOV; Jones Darrin FBI USA GOV; [redacted] FBI USA GOV; Cohen Brian FBI USA GOV; Gavin Michael FBI USA GOV; [redacted] FBI USA GOV; [redacted] FBI USA GOV; Butler Cassandra FBI USA GOV; williams justin FBI USA GOV; Kern Julie FBI USA GOV; [redacted] FBI USA GOV; [redacted] FBI USA GOV [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)
Subject: FBI Update through July 30th --- ~~TOP SECRET//SI-G//ORCON/NOFORN//LES~~
Attachments: [redacted] PIN Tokyo Olympics, 2021-07-19.pdf; [redacted]

Classification: ~~TOP SECRET//SI-G//ORCON/NOFORN//LES~~

Classified By: [redacted] b6-1 per FBI b7C-1 per FBI
Derived From: FBI NSICG
Declassify On: 50X1-HUM
==========

Director Haines,

(U) Please see our update below, which summarizes FBI operational and intelligence activities during the past week. Please let me know if you have any questions or would like additional information about any of these items.

Respectfully,

[redacted] b6-1 per FBI b7C-1 per FBI

(U) FBI OPERATIONAL UPDATES:

- (U//~~LES~~) On July 21, FBI Tampa in coordination with FBI Miami, arrested [redacted] without incident, pursuant to an indictment in the Southern District of Florida. [redacted] was charged with [redacted]. On October 8, 2019, FBI Miami opened an investigation based on [redacted] reporting indicating [redacted] was [redacted] On April 5, 2020, [redacted] on behalf of an FBI Tampa subject. On July 5, 2020, FBI Miami [redacted] On July 14, 2021, [redacted] was indicted in the Southern District of Florida. *(FBI National Security Branch)* b6-4 per FBI b7C-4 per FBI b7D-4 per FBI

- (U//~~LES~~) On July 29, FBI Pittsburgh executed 16 arrest warrants and eight search warrants on locations in West Virginia, as part of an investigation targeting a multi-district drug trafficking organization who distributed cocaine, heroin and methamphetamine. The investigation, initiated in November 2020, was a joint effort between the FBI, DEA, U.S. Marshalls Service, Cabell County Sheriff's Office, Cabell County Home Confinement, Marshall University Police Department, Hurricane Police Department, West Virginia State Police, West Virginia Department of Corrections, and Federal Parole and Probation. As of July 27, approximately 1.48 Kgs of cocaine, 1.17 Kgs of heroin, .712 Kgs of methamphetamine, $84,830, and two firearms have been seized. *(FBI Criminal Investigative Division)*

(U) FBI-GENERATED INTELLIGENCE:

- (U//~~FOUO~~) In a July 22 Strategic Perspective: Executive Analytic Report, our Criminal Investigative Division, FBI Chicago, FBI Houston, and FBI Minneapolis assessed criminal actors will very likely increasingly burglarize bank-owned automated teller machines (ATMs) for financial gain, posing greater risk of economic harm than bank robberies. Unlike bank robberies, ATM burglaries result in both significant cash loss and property damage for the U.S. banking industry. While unsuccessful ATM burglaries do not result in compromised ATM safes and immediate cash loss from the ATM, the property damage results in monetary losses in the form of repair and replacement costs. An increase in ATM burglaries in the past two years, coupled with continued decreases in bank robberies over the past ten years, underscores the emerging economic threat of ATM burglaries. The U.S. banking industry's limited ability to fortify ATMs nationwide, the availability of online resources to learn ATM burglary techniques, and potential access to large sums of cash present ample opportunities for criminal actors to exploit ATM physical vulnerabilities for financial gain. *(FBI Criminal Investigative Division, FBI Chicago, FBI Houston, FBI Minneapolis)*
- (U) b1-1 per FBI; b3-5 per FBI; b7E-4,8 per FBI
(~~S//NF~~) [redacted] *(FBI Counterterrorism Division)*
- (U) b1-1 per FBI; b3-5 per FBI; b7E-4,8 per FBI
(~~S//NF~~) [redacted] *(FBI Chicago)*
- (U) b1-1 per FBI; b3-5 per FBI; b7E-4,8 per FBI
(~~S//NF~~) [redacted] *FBI Philadelphia and FBI New York)*

(U) IC COOPERATION / FBI PARTNER ENGAGEMENT

- (U) b1-1 per FBI; b3-5 per FBI, b3 per ODNI; b6 per ODNI; b7E-4,8 per FBI
(~~S//NF~~) [redacted] *(FBI Bureau Intelligence Council)*
- (U//~~FOUO~~) On July 26, SNIO (b)(3), (b)(6) briefed the ODNI-sponsored Intelligence Community Studies Board of the National Academies of Sciences on domestic terrorism and how the FBI investigates and mitigates the threat. The IC Studies Board requested the briefing due to the current prominence of domestic terrorism issues and the Board's relative unfamiliarity with the threat. *(FBI Bureau Intelligence Council)*
- (U) b1-1 per FBI b3-5 per FBI b7E-4,8 per FBI
(~~S//NF~~) [redacted]
- ~~S//NF~~) [redacted]

b1-1 per FBI, b1 per CIA; b3-5 per FBI, b3 per CIA; b7E-4,8 per FBI

- (~~S//NF~~) [redacted]
- (~~S//NF~~) [redacted]

b1-1 per FBI; b3-5 per FBI; b7E-4,8,13,14 per FBI

- (~~S//NF~~) [redacted]
- (~~S//NF~~) [redacted] *FBI WMDD)*

- (U) From July 26 – 30, our Office of Partner Engagement (OPE) participated in the following engagements with law enforcement partners:

- (U) OPE provided Mobilization Indicators Training to Terrorism Liaison Officers (TLO) in Chicago, Illinois. The event was designed for the Chicago Police Department's TLOs and personnel from their Intelligence Division, and focused on homegrown violent extremist mobilization indicators.

- (U) OPE participated in the Fire Rescue International Conference in Charlotte, North Carolina. The conference was designed for senior leadership in the fire and emergency medical services sector. Special Agent in Charge Christopher Combs provided an introductory overview of homegrown violent extremist mobilization indicators for the attendees. *(FBI Office of Partner Engagement)*

(U) FBI CYBER ACTIVITIES:

(U) Nation-State Cyber Threats:

(U)

b1-1 per FBI; b3-5 per FBI; b7E-3,4,8, per FBI

- (~~TS//SI-G//OC/NF~~ [redacted] his HIB article may be requested by contacting [redacted] *(FBI Cyber Division and NSA)*

(U)

b1-1 per FBI; b3-5 per FBI; b7E-4,8 per FBI

- (~~S//NF~~) [redacted] *(FBI New York, FBI San Francisco, and FBI Cyber Division)*

(U) Sharing Cyber Threat Information with the Private Sector and the Public:

b1-1 per FBI, b1 per CIA; b3-5 per FBI,b3 per CIA; b7E-8,14 per FBI

- (~~S//NF~~) [redacted] *FBI Cyber Division)*

- (U) On July 19, our Cyber Division joined IC partners to disseminate several public advisories in support of the July 16 unsealing of indictments against four Chinese nationals working with China's Ministry of State Security. The four are charged with a campaign to hack into the computer systems of dozens of victim companies, universities, and government entities in the United

States and abroad. Much of their conspiracy was focused on information that was of significant economic benefit to China's companies and commercial sectors. *(FBI Cyber Division)*

b7E-4,8,14 per FBI

(U) [redacted] *(FBI Cyber Division and CISA)*

b7E-4,8,14 per FBI

(U [redacted] *CISA, and FBI Cyber Division)*

b7E-4,8,14 per FBI

(U) [redacted] *FBI Cyber Division)*

(U) All three products are available at us-cert.cisa.gov. These products were disseminated as part of a coordinated effort by the United States, its allies, and partners to attribute malicious cyber activity and irresponsible state behavior to the People's Republic of China. Actions included the unsealing of the indictment, and public statements from the White House, Department of Justice, Department of State, European Union, the United Kingdom, and NATO.

- (U) On July 19, our Cyber Division issued a Private Industry Notification (PIN) to warn about the potential for malicious cyber activities to disrupt the 2021 Tokyo Summer Olympics. There have been no specific cyber threats against this event but the PIN encourages partners to remain vigilant and maintain best practices as large, high-profile events like the Olympics have attracted the attention of criminal and nation-state cyber actors. The PIN is available at IC3.gov and through the FBI's social media accounts. *(FBI Cyber Division)*

b1-1 per FBI' b3-5 per FBI; b7E-4,8 per FBI

- (U) (~~TS//NF~~) [redacted] *(FBI Cyber Division and CISA)*

(U) Nonstate Actors and Cyber Crime:

b1-1 per FBI, b1 per CIA; b3-5 per FBI, b3 per CIA; b7E-4,8,14 per FBI

- [redacted]
- [redacted]

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Classification: ~~TOP SECRET//SI-G//ORCON/NOFORN//LES~~

DATE 6/20/2023
FBI INFO CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG/ [redacted]
REASON: 1.4(C)
DECLASSIFY ON 6/20/2023
b6-1 per FBI
b7C-1 per FBI

[redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

From: [redacted] (DO) (FBI) [redacted]
Sent: Friday, June 11, 2021 11:00 AM
To: Avril D. Haines-DNI-
b3-4,5 per FBI, b3 per CIA; b6-1 per FBI, b6 per CIA; b7C-1 per FBI; b7E-3 per FBI
Cc: Wray Christopher FBI USA GOV; Abbate Paul FBI USA GOV; Sallet Jeffrey FBI USA GOV; Vorndran Bryan FBI USA GOV; UGORETZ TONYA FBI USA GOV; Corsi Dina FBI USA GOV; [redacted] (KC) (FBI); [redacted] FBI USA GOV; Sanborn Jill FBI USA GOV; Knapp Larissa FBI USA GOV; Turner Brian FBI USA GOV; Young Ryan FBI USA GOV; Jones Darrin FBI USA GOV; [redacted] FBI USA GOV; Cohen Brian FBI USA GOV; Gavin Michael FBI USA GOV; [redacted] FBI USA GOV; [redacted] FBI USA GOV; Butler Cassandra FBI USA GOV; williams justin FBI USA GOV; Kern Julie FBI USA GOV; [redacted] FBI USA GOV; [redacted] FBI USA GOV; [redacted] FBI USA GOV; [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)
Subject: FBI update through June 11th --- ~~TOP SECRET//~~ [redacted] ~~SI//ORCON/NOFORN/FISA//LES~~
Attachments: [redacted]

Classification: ~~TOP SECRET//~~[redacted]~~/SI//ORCON/NOFORN~~[redacted]~~//LES~~

b1-1 per FBI
b3-5 per FBI,
b3 per CIA
b6 per CIA

Classified By: [redacted]
Derived From: FBI NSICG
Declassify On: 50X1-HUM

b6-1 per FBI
b7C-1 per FBI

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b7E-4,8 per FBI

Director Haines,

(U) Please see our update below, which summarizes FBI operational and intelligence activities during the past week. Please let me know if you have any questions or would like additional information about any of these items.

Respectfully,

[redacted]

b6-1 per FBI
b7C-1 per FBI

(U) FBI OPERATIONAL UPDATES:

- (U) On June 4, Alla Witte, a Latvian national, received multiple charges in federal court from her alleged role in a transnational cybercrime organization responsible for creating and deploying a computer banking trojan and ransomware suite of malware, known as "Trickbot." Witte was charged as an alleged member of the Trickbot Group which operated in Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Suriname, and primarily targeted victim computers belonging to businesses, entities, and individuals located in the United States and other countries. Targets included hospitals, schools, public utilities, and governments. Witte worked as a malware developer for the Trickbot Group and wrote code related to the control, deployment, and payments of ransomware. Our Cleveland field office investigated the case as part of the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Ransomware and Digital Extortion Task Force, which was established to combat the growing number of ransomware and digital extortion attacks. *(DOJ Press Release)*
- (U) On June 7, DOJ announced that it had seized 63.7 bitcoins valued near $2.3 million. The funds represented the proceeds from a May 8 ransom payment to the cybercrime group, DarkSide, who targeted the Colonial Pipeline, temporarily shutting down operations in a highly publicized ransomware attack. By reviewing the Bitcoin public ledger, the FBI and law enforcement

partners were able to track multiple transfers leading to the specific address associated with the ransomware payment. The investigation and seizure were the result of DOJ's Ransomware and Digital Extortion Task Force. *(DOJ Press Release)*

- (U) On June 8, a federal grand jury charged 17 foreign nationals with distributing thousands of encrypted communications devices to criminal syndicates. Five-hundred-plus arrests connected to the FBI-operated commination application occurred over a two-day worldwide takedown, known as Operation Trojan Shield. In an original tactic, the FBI ran its own encrypted device company, called "ANOM," which was promoted by criminal groups worldwide. The criminals sold more than 12,000 ANOM-encrypted devices and services to more than 300 criminal syndicates operating in more than 100 countries, including Italian organized crime, outlaw motorcycle gangs, and various international drug-trafficking organizations. Agents catalogued more than 27 million messages that occurred on the ANOM platform throughout the course of the investigation. In a 48-hour period, authorities searched more than 700 locations deploying more than 9,000 law enforcement officers worldwide and seized multi-ton quantities of illicit drugs. The investigation and operation were the result of a coordinated effort involving multinational law enforcement organizations orchestrated by the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force and our San Diego Field Office. *(DOJ Press Release)*

b1-1 per FBI
b3-5 per FBI
b3 per CIA
b7E-4,8 per FBI

(U) FBI-GENERATED INTELLIGENCE:

(U)

- ~~(TS//~~ [redacted] ~~/SI//OC/NF)~~ [redacted] *(FBI Directorate of Intelligence-Global Intelligence Section and FBI Counterintelligence Division)*

b1-1 per FBI; b3-5 per FBI; b7E-4,8 per FBI

- ~~(S//NF)~~ In a June 8 SPEAR, our Internet Governance Program Office and Operational Technology Division [redacted] *FBI Internet Governance Program Office and FBI Operational Technology Division)*

(U) IC COOPERATION/FBI PARTNER ENGAGEMENT:

- (U) On June 4, 7, 8, and 9, our Office of Partner Engagement provided Level I active shooter training, titled "Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training (ALERRT)" to new agents at the FBI Academy. *(FBI Office of Partner Engagement)*

- (U) On June 9, our Office of Partner Engagement presented at the FBI National Academy Associates Mass-Casualty Prevention Leadership Forum. *(FBI Office of Partner Engagement)*

- (U//~~FOUO~~) On June 7 and 8, our Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate (WMDD) hosted its first annual Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Day in Huntsville, Alabama. The event showcased UAS and Unmanned Ground Systems with FBI stakeholders, interagency partners, DoD, academia, and commercial entities within the greater Huntsville region. *(FBI Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate)*

b1-1 per FBI; b3-5 per FBI; b7E-4,8,14 per FBI

- (~~S//NF~~) [redacted] *(FBI Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate)*

b1 per CIA ,b3 per CIA

FBI(21-cv-1619)-965

b1-1 per FBI; b3-5 per FBI; b7E-4,8 per FBI

- (U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted]. *(FBI Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate)*

b7E-4,8 per FBI

- (U//~~FOUO~~) On June 10, our WMDD Intelligence Analysis Section hosted a meeting with our Unidentified Aerial Phenomena (UAP) Working Group and our Counterterrorism Division's Civil Aviation Security Program to discuss [redacted] *(FBI Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate)*

(U) DOMESTIC DNI REPRESENTATIVE PROGRAM:

- (U//~~FOUO~~) On June 3, the Domestic DNI Representative (DDNIR) Program's East Central Region held its fiscal year (FY) 2021, third-quarter meeting hosted by our Cleveland field office. The meeting's agenda included briefings related to the Darknet from the following entities: FBI Headquarters (HQ), Criminal Investigative Division (CID), JCODE; FBI HQ, CID, Child Exploitation Operational Unit (CEOU); FBI Cleveland; FBI Pittsburgh; FBI Cincinnati; FBI Louisville; and the National Counter Terrorism Center. The DDNIR East Central Region FY 2021 fourth-quarter meeting will take place in late August or early September 2021. The calendars of the four regional Special Agents in Charge (SAC) will be consulted for a best date. *(FBI Office of Partner Engagement)*
- ~~(S//NF)~~ On June 4, the Pacific Northwest (PNW) Region held its third-quarter DDNIR meeting at our Anchorage field office. This was FBI Seattle SAC Don Voiret's first DDNIR meeting as PNW Representative and included the following presentations and discussions:

b1 per CIA; b3 per CIA; b7E-14 perFBI

- [redacted]
- (U//~~FOUO~~) Domestic Violent Extremism (DVE): FBI Seattle provided a four-hour presentation on DVE. This presentation included DVE history, theory, and current DVE threats.
- [redacted]

(U) FBI CYBER ACTIVITIES:

b1-1 per FBI, b1 per CIA; b3-5 per FBI, b3 per CIA; b7E-4,8 per FBI

(U) Nation-State Cyber Threats:

b1-1 per FBI; b3-5 per FBI; b7A-1 per FBI; b7E-4,8 per FBI

- (U) ~~(S//NF//LES)~~ [redacted] *FBI Cyber Division and FBI Houston)*

(U) Sharing Cyber Threat Information with the Private Sector and the Public:

- (U) On June 3, the FBI briefed intelligence managers from the United Kingdom, France, Israel, UAE, and Bahrain at an engagement organized by Harvard Kennedy School's Recanati-Kaplan Foundation Fellows Program. Our Cyber Division presented an overview of cyber threats and discussed how the FBI and government can work with the private sector to create better collective cyber defense. Our Counterterrorism Division provided a briefing on domestic terrorism. Attendees at this event also received briefings from ODNI, DIA, NSC, and Congressional staff. *(FBI Cyber Division and FBI Counterterrorism Division)*

b3-5 per FBI
b7A-1 per FBI
b7E-3,4,8 per FBI

(U) Nonstate Actors and Cyber Crime:

- (U//~~FOUO~~) On June 3, our Cyber Division authored a [redacted] may be requested by contacting [redacted] *(FBI Cyber Division)*

b3-5 per FBI
b7E-4,8 per FBI

(U) Emerging Technologies:

- (U//~~FOUO~~) On June 4, the FBI [redacted] *(FBI Cyber Division, FBI Operational Technology Division, and FBI Detroit)*

[redacted]
FBI - Intelligence Branch
[redacted]
[redacted] (Unclass)
[redacted] (Office)

b6-1 per FBI
b7C-1 per FBI
b7E-3 per FBI

==========

Classification: ~~TOP SECRET/[redacted]/SI//ORCON/NOFORN[redacted]//LES~~

b1-1 per FBI
b3-5 per FBI
b3 per CIA
b7E-4,8 per FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERER OTHERWISE
SHOWN

DATE 7/26/2024
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]
REASON: 1.4(C)
DECLASSIFY ON 12/31/2049

b1-1
b3-5
b6-1
b7C-1
b7E-4,8

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION TECHNICAL ANALYSIS BULLETIN

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) [redacted]

15 JUNE 2021
FBI TAB [redacted]

b6-1
b7C-1
b7E-2,4,5,8

Classified by: [redacted]
Derived from: Multiple Sources
Declassify on: 50X1-HUM

(U) This document is classified: TOP SECRET//[redacted]
(U) Technical Analysis Bulletin template approved for fiscal year 2021, as of 1 October 2020.

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) [redacted]

(U) (TS//[redacted]

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b3-5
b7D-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) (TS//[redacted])[redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

[a] [redacted].
[b] [redacted]
[c] [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) [d] (TS//[redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,8

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,8

[redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

SECRET//~~NOFORN~~

(U) Source Summary Statement

(U) (S//~~NF~~) [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7D-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) (TS//~~OC/NF~~ [redacted]

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b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) (TS//[redacted])

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b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) (TS//[redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) • (TS//[redacted]

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b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

[e] (U//~~FOUO~~) *Analyst Note:* [redacted]

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b3-5
b7D-5
b7E-4,5,8

[f] (U) *Analyst Note:* [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

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b3-5
b7E-4,8

b1-1
b3-5
b7D-5
b7E-4,5,8

[redacted]

(U) • (S//~~NF~~) [redacted]

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b3-5
b7D-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) (TS//[redacted]) [redacted]

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b3-5
b7D-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) • (S//~~NF~~) [redacted]

(U) • (S//~~NF~~) [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) (S//~~NF~~) [redacted]

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b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) • (S//~~NF~~) [redacted]

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b3-5
b7D-5
b7E-4,5,8

[redacted]

[g] (U) [redacted]

[h] (U) *Analyst Note*: [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

[redacted].

[i] (U) *Analyst Note*: [redacted]

(U) [j] (S//~~NF~~) *Analyst Note*: [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

[k] (U) *Analyst Note*: [redacted]

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b7E-4,8

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,8

[redacted]

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b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) • (S//NF) [redacted][14]

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b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) (TS//[redacted]) [redacted]

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b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) • (TS//[redacted]) [redacted]

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b3-5
b7D-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) • (TS//[redacted]) [redacted]

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b3-5
b6-4
b7C-4
b7D-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) • (S//NF) [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7D-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) • (S//NF) [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7D-5
b7E-4,5,8

[l] (U) *Analyst Note*: [redacted]

[m] (U) See Appendix D: [redacted]

[n] (U) *Analyst Note*: [redacted]

[o] (U) See Appendix E: [redacted]

(U) [p] (TS//[redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7D-5
b7E-4,5,8

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b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,8

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b3-5
b7E-4,8

(U) (S//~~NF~~) [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

- (U) [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) • (S//~~NF~~) [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7D-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) Perspective

(U) (TS//[redacted]) [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) (S//[redacted]//~~NF~~) [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,8

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b3-5
b7E-4,8

(U) (TS//[redacted])[redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) Analysis of Alternatives

(U) (S//~~NF~~)[redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) Outlook

(U) (S//~~NF~~)[redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) [9] (TS//[redacted]) *Analyst Note*: Per the abovementioned[redacted], the USIC remains divided in its judgment of which transmission path is most probable, but nearly all agencies continue to judge the virus was not genetically engineered.

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,8

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,8

(U) (S//~~NF~~) [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) [redacted]

b7E-2,3,4

(U) [redacted]

b7E-3,4

(U) [redacted]

b7E-3,4

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,8

(b) (1) - (1), (b) (3) - (5), (b) (5) - (1), (b) (7)(E) - (4)(8)

(b) (1) - (1), (b) (3) - (5), (b) (5) - (1), (b) (7)(E) - (4)(8)

(b) (1) - (1), (b) (3) - (5), (b) (5) - (1), (b) (7)(E) - (4)(5)(8)

(b) (1) - (1), (b) (3) - (5), (b) (5) - (1), (b) (7)(E) - (4)(8)

(b) (1) - (1), (b) (3) - (5), (b) (5) - (1), (b) (7)(E) - (4)(8)

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,8

(U) Endnotes

[1] (U) FBI | Case Information | [redacted] | "[TITLE REDACTED]" | UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ | SECRET//~~NOFORN~~. b7E-4

(U) [2] (S//~~NF~~) FBI | IIR [redacted] SECRET//~~NOFORN~~ | SECRET//~~NOFORN~~. b1-1 b3-5 b7E-4,5,8

(U) [3] (S//~~NF~~) FBI | IIR [redacted] | SECRET//~~NOFORN~~ | SECRET//~~NOFORN~~. b1-1 b3-5 b7E-4,5,8

(U) [4] (S//~~NF~~) FBI | IIR [redacted] SECRET//~~NOFORN~~ | SECRET//~~NOFORN~~.

(U) [5] (TS// [redacted] b1-1 b3-5 b7E-4,5,8

(U) [6] (TS// [redacted] b1-1 b3-5 b7E-4,5,8

(U) [7] (S//~~NF~~) FBI | IIR [redacted] | SECRET//~~NOFORN~~ | SECRET//~~NOFORN~~. b1-1 b3-5 b7E-4,5,8

[8] (U) [redacted] b7E-4

[9] (U) [redacted] b7E-4

(U) [10] (S//~~NF~~) FBI | IIR [redacted] | SECRET//~~NOFORN~~ | SECRET//~~NOFORN~~. b1-1 b3-5 b7E-4,5,8

[11] (U) FBI | Case Information | [redacted] | "[TITLE REDACTED]" | UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ | UNCLASSIFIED ~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~.

(U) [12] (S//~~NF~~) FBI | IIR [redacted] SECRET//~~NOFORN~~ | SECRET//~~NOFORN~~. b1-1 b3-5 b7E-4,5,8

(U) [13] (S//~~NF~~) FBI | IIR [redacted] SECRET//~~NOFORN~~ | SECRET//~~NOFORN~~. b1-1 b3-5 b7E-4,5,8

(U) [14] (S//~~NF~~) FBI | IIR [redacted] | SECRET//~~NOFORN~~ | SECRET//~~NOFORN~~.

(U) [15] (TS// [redacted] b1-1 b3-5 b7E-4,5,8

(U) [16] (S//~~NF~~) FBI | IIR [redacted] SECRET//~~NOFORN~~ | SECRET//~~NOFORN~~. b1-1 b3-5 b7E-4,5,8

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,8

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,8

(U) [17] (TS/[redacted]

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b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) [18] (S/~~NF~~) FBI | IIR | [redacted] | [redacted] SECRET//~~NOFORN~~ | SECRET//~~NOFORN~~.

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) [19] (S/~~NF~~) FBI | IIR | [redacted] | [redacted] SECRET//~~NOFORN~~ | SECRET//~~NOFORN~~.

(U) [20] (U) [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

[21] (U) FBI | Case Information | [redacted] | "[TITLE REDACTED]" | UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ | UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~.

(U) [22] (S/~~NF~~) FBI | IIR | [redacted] | [redacted] SECRET//~~NOFORN~~ | SECRET//~~NOFORN~~.

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) [23] (TS/[redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

[24] (U) [redacted]

b7E-4

[25] (U) [redacted]

b7E-4

[26] (U) [redacted]

b7E-4

[27] (U) [redacted]

b7E-4

[28] (U) [redacted]

b7E-4

[29] (U) [redacted]

b7E-4

[30] (U) [redacted]

b7E-4

(U) [31] (TS/[redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

[32] (U) [redacted]

b7E-4

[33] (U) [redacted]

b7E-4

[34] (U) [redacted]

b7E-4

[35] (U) [redacted]

b7E-4

[36] (U) [redacted]

b7E-4

[37] (U) [redacted]

b7E-4

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,8

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,8

[38] (U) [redacted]

b7E-4

[39] (U) [redacted]

b7E-4

[40] (U) [redacted]

b7E-4

[41] (U) [redacted]

b7E-4

[42] (U) [redacted]

b7E-4

[43] (U) [redacted]

b7E-4

[redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,8

WIF for Consultation

WIF for Consultation

WIF for Consultation

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-06-2025 BY [redacted] NSICG

[redacted]

b3 -5
b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -1

FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10)

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN//LES~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

Title: (U) Declassification Authority Request: Documentation of Verbal Declassification [redacted] [redacted]

Date: 03/27/2023

b7E -2

From: [redacted]

Contact: [redacted]

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -2,3

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

b3 -5
b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -1,4,6,8

Case ID #: [redacted] (U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted]

(U) **Synopsis:** ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] an Original Classification Authority (OCA), verbally authorized a partial declassification of information from [redacted] for verbal use of the attached and below-listed statements for [redacted]

b3 -5
b7E -1,2,4,8

~~Reason: 1.4(b)~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSICG~~
~~Declassify On: 50X1-HUM~~

Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the following items:

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN//LES~~

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN//LES~~

Title: (U) Declassification Authority Request: Documentation of Verbal Declassification [redacted] b3 -5 b7E -1,2,4

Re: [redacted] 03/27/2023

(U) 1. ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] – Document for partial Declassification – Statement as marked on digital copy [redacted]

Details:

(U) Background

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] an Original Classification Authority (OCA), verbally authorized partial declassification of information from [redacted] for verbal use of the attached and below-listed information for [redacted] b3 -5 b7E -1,2,4,8

[redacted]

(U) Predication

(U) [redacted]

[redacted] b7E -4,5,8

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN//LES~~

b3 -5
b7E -1,2

Title: (U) Declassification Authority Request: Documentation of Verbal Declassification by [redacted]
Re: [redacted] 03/27/2023

(U) ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ [redacted]

b1 -per ODNI
b3 -5 per FBI, ODNI
b7E -1,2,4,5,6,8,14

(U)

~~(S)~~

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted]

b7E -4

[redacted] b3 -5 b7E -1

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN//LES~~

Title: (U) Declassification Authority Request: Documentation of Verbal Declassification by [redacted] b3 -5 b7E -1,2

Re: [redacted] 03/27/2023

[redacted] b7E -4

(U) **Declassification Authority Justification**

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] a Declassification Authority, provided declassification of one sentence contained within [redacted] for use in [redacted] b3 -5 b7E -1,2,4,8

(U) The sentence within [redacted] is marked and located on [redacted] b3 -5 b7E -1,4

TEARLINE

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] b7E -2,4,5,8

(U) The second statement [redacted] was spoken by FBI Director Christopher Wray on February 28, 2023 during a Fox News interview:

(U) "The FBI has long assessed the origin of the pandemic was likely a laboratory-associated incident in Wuhan."

END OF TEARLINE

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN//LES~~

[redacted]

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN//LES~~

Title: (U) Declassification Authority Request: Documentation of Verbal Declassification [redacted] b3 -5 b7E -1,2

Re: [redacted] 03/27/2023

(U) Protection of Classified Information

(U/~~FOUO~~) [redacted] have reviewed the information to be declassified: b7E -2

(U) (S/~~NF~~) The declassification request [redacted] b7E -4,8

(U//~~FOUO~~) Per the FBI's Declassification of Classified National Security Information Guide, [redacted] has reviewed the applicable information to be declassified [redacted] b7E -2,4

1. (U/~~FOUO~~) [redacted] b7E -4,8

2. (U/~~FOUO~~) [redacted] b3 -5 b7E -4,8

3. (U/~~FOUO~~) [redacted] b3 -5 b7E -4,8,14

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN//LES~~

[redacted]

Title: (U) Declassification Authority Request: Documentation of Verbal Declassification [redacted] b3 -5 b7E 1,2
Re: [redacted] 03/27/2023

4. (U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] b7E -4,8

5. (U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] b7E -4

6. (U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] b7E -4

(U) Based upon the above justification, [redacted] an OCA, is requested to formally approve declassification of the above outlined material for use by [redacted] b7E -2,4,8

(U) Records Management Division [redacted] is requested to concur with declassification of information contained in the proposed tearline. b7E -2

(U) The [redacted] is respectfully requested to cover the lead. b7E -2

(U) Any questions or concerns regarding the above request should be submitted to [redacted] b6 -1 b7C -1 b7E -2,3

♦♦

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
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FOI/PA# 23-cv-1768

Total Deleted Page(s) = 28
Page 11 ~ b1 - 1 per FBI, DOD; b3 - 5 per FBI, DOD; b7D - 5 per FBI; b7E - 1,3,4,5,8 per FBI;
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Page 40 ~ b1 - 1 per FBI, DOD; b3 - 5 per FBI, DOD; b7D - 5 per FBI; b7E - 2,4,5,8 per FBI;
Page 41 ~ b7D - 5; b7E - 4,5,8;
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Page 46 ~ b5 - 1; b7E - 4;
Page 47 ~ b5 - 1; b7E - 4;
Page 48 ~ b5 - 1; b7E - 4,5;
Page 49 ~ b5 - 1; b7E - 4;
Page 50 ~ b5 - 1; b7E - 4;
Page 51 ~ b1 - 1 per FBI, DOD; b3 - 5 per FBI, DOD; b7E - 4,5,8 per FBI;
Page 52 ~ b1 - 1; b3 - 5; b7E - 4,5,8;
Page 53 ~ b3 - 5; b7E - 4,5,8;
Page 54 ~ b7E - 4;

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CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2048
DATE: 05-30-2025

☆ [redacted]

Action

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b6 -1
b7C -1
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b7E -1,2,4

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[redacted]

di ☆ [redacted]

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[redacted]

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(U) PREPARED BY [redacted]

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b7E -6

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b7E -1

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b1 -1 per FBI, DOD
b3 -5 per FBI, DOD
b7E -2,4,5,8 per FBI

~~(S)~~ (U)

~~(S)~~ (U)

a (U)
b (U) Analyst Note:

b7E -4,5,8

c (U)

d (U//~~FOUO~~)

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a1 ☆ [redacted]

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b3 -5
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



m ☆ [redacted]

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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(U) Endnotes

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[redacted]

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(U) *~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [redacted] b7E -3,4,5,8

[redacted]

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

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b7C -1

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Lead Report

Precedence: Routine **Date:** 08/10/2023
Lead Type: Action
Deadline: 05/26/2023
Lead Number: 16

From: [redacted]
Contact: [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -2,3

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: [redacted] (U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted]

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b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -1,2,4,6,8

Reference: [redacted]

Details: (U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] respectfully requests declassification action by [redacted] for the referenced statements.

Re: [redacted]

Lead: 16, 08/10/2023

Location

To: [redacted]

Recipient:

Assignee:

Attn:

Status: Covered

Coverages:

03/31/2023 by [redacted]

Reference: [redacted]

(U) [redacted] concurs with declassification of the tearline sentence.

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b7E -1,2,3

♦♦

[redacted]

DECLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]
ON 06-20-2024

FD-1036 (Rev. 10-16-2009)

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b7C -1
b7E -1,4,5,8

Form Type: [redacted] Date: 09/29/2021

(U) Title: ~~(S//OC,USGOV/NF//LES)~~ [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

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Case ID #: [redacted]

(U) Synopsis: ~~(S//OC,USGOV/NF//LES)~~ [redacted]

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(U) [redacted]

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b7E -2,4,5,8 per FBI

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[redacted]

[a] (U) [redacted]
[b] (U) *Analyst Note:* [redacted]
[c] (U) [redacted]
[d] (U) ~~FOUO~~: [redacted]

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b7E -4,5,8

23-cv-1768(FBI)-39

[redacted] (FBI)

From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, May 25, 2021 4:40 PM
To: [redacted] (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (FBI); [redacted] (FBI); [redacted] (FBI); [redacted] (FBI); [redacted] (FBI)
Subject: RE: NYT Media Inquiry - COVID-19 --- UNCLASSIFIED

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b7C -1
b7E -2,3

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
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b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -2,3

Good afternoon [redacted]

[redacted]

Thank you,

[redacted]

From: [redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, May 25, 2021 3:36 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted] (FBI); [redacted] (FBI); [redacted] (FBI); [redacted]
Subject: NYT Media Inquiry - COVID-19 --- UNCLASSIFIED
Importance: High

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b7C -1
b7E -2,3

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
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TRANSITORY RECORD

b3 -5
b5 -1 per FBI, ODNI
b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -2,3,14

Good afternoon, [redacted] received an inquiry from the New York Times regarding the origins of the Coronavirus. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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b7C -1
b5 -1 per FBI, ODNI

[redacted]

Thanks in advance.

v/r,

[redacted]

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b7C -1
b7E -3

FBIHQ, National Press Office

[redacted]

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Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

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Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

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b7C -1

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL

Updated Assessment on

COVID-19 ORIGINS

23-cv-1768(FBI)-91

Updated Assessment on COVID-19 Origins

Key Takeaways

Scope Note: This assessment responds to the President's request that the Intelligence Community (IC) update its previous judgments on the origins of COVID-19. It also identifies areas for possible additional research. Annexes include a lexicon, additional details on methodology, and comments from outside experts. This assessment is based on information through August 2021.

The IC assesses that SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, probably emerged and infected humans through an initial small-scale exposure that occurred no later than November 2019 with the first known cluster of COVID-19 cases arising in Wuhan, China in December 2019. In addition, the IC was able to reach broad agreement on several other key issues. We judge the virus was not developed as a biological weapon. Most agencies also assess with low confidence that SARS-CoV-2 probably was not genetically engineered; however, two agencies believe there was not sufficient evidence to make an assessment either way. Finally, the IC assesses China's officials did not have foreknowledge of the virus before the initial outbreak of COVID-19 emerged.

After examining all available intelligence reporting and other information, though, the IC remains divided on the most likely origin of COVID-19. All agencies assess that two hypotheses are plausible: natural exposure to an infected animal and a laboratory-associated incident.

- Four IC elements and the National Intelligence Council assess with low confidence that the initial SARS-CoV-2 infection was most likely caused by natural exposure to an animal infected with it or a close progenitor virus—a virus that probably would be more than 99 percent similar to SARS-CoV-2. These analysts give weight to China's officials' lack of foreknowledge, the numerous vectors for natural exposure, and other factors.

- One IC element assesses with moderate confidence that the first human infection with SARS-CoV-2 most likely was the result of a laboratory-associated incident, probably involving experimentation, animal handling, or sampling by the Wuhan Institute of Virology. These analysts give weight to the inherently risky nature of work on coronaviruses.

- Analysts at three IC elements remain unable to coalesce around either explanation without additional information, with some analysts favoring natural origin, others a laboratory origin, and some seeing the hypotheses as equally likely.

- Variations in analytic views largely stem from differences in how agencies weigh intelligence reporting and scientific publications and intelligence and scientific gaps.

The IC judges they will be unable to provide a more definitive explanation for the origin of COVID-19 unless new information allows them to determine the specific pathway for initial natural contact with an animal or to determine that a laboratory in Wuhan was handling SARS-CoV-2 or a close progenitor virus before COVID-19 emerged.

- The IC—and the global scientific community—lacks clinical samples or a complete understanding of epidemiological data from the earliest COVID-19 cases. If we obtain information on the earliest cases that identified a location of interest or occupational exposure, it may alter our evaluation of hypotheses.

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China's cooperation most likely would be needed to reach a conclusive assessment of the origins of COVID-19. Beijing, however, continues to hinder the global investigation, resist sharing information, and blame other countries, including the United States. These actions reflect, in part, China's government's own uncertainty about where an investigation could lead as well as its frustration the international community is using the issue to exert political pressure on China.

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IC Assessments of COVID-19 Origins

- First known cluster of COVID-19 cases emerged in Wuhan, China in December 2019
- Virus not developed as a biological weapon
- Virus not genetically engineered
- China's officials unaware of virus before pandemic emerged



- Natural transmission from animal to human
- Laboratory-associated incident
- Evidence not strongly diagnostic of either hypothesis



- Beijing's lack of cooperation on origins not diagnostic of either hypothesis
- Numerous information gaps, particularly related to technical data

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Introduction

The IC has prepared several assessments examining the origins of COVID-19. Analysts have focused on whether SARS-CoV-2, the causative virus of COVID-19, was genetically engineered—particularly as a biological weapon—was transmitted to humans naturally or transmitted due to a laboratory-associated incident, perhaps during sampling or experimentation. China's reaction to and handling of the pandemic have given analysts insights into these issues, but Beijing's actions have also impeded the global scientific community and our ability to confidently determine how the virus first infected humans.

SARS-CoV-2 Probably Not a Biological Weapon

The IC assesses China did not develop SARS-CoV-2 as a biological weapon.

- We remain skeptical of allegations that SARS-CoV-2 was a biological weapon because they are supported by scientifically invalid claims, their proponents do not have direct access to the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), or their proponents are suspected of spreading disinformation. [*See appendix B.*]

Most Analysts Assess SARS-CoV-2 Not Genetically Engineered

Most IC analysts assess with low confidence that SARS-CoV-2 was not genetically engineered. Their assessment is based on technical analysis of SARS-CoV-2 and the IC's growing understanding of traits and the potential for recombination in other coronaviruses. Two agencies believe there is not sufficient evidence to make an assessment either way.

- As of August 2021, we still have not observed genetic signatures in SARS-CoV-2 that would be diagnostic of genetic engineering, according to the IC's understanding of the virus. Similarly, we have not identified any existing coronavirus strains that could have plausibly served as a backbone if SARS-CoV-2 had been genetically engineered.

- Our growing understanding of the similarities of SARS-CoV-2 to other coronaviruses in nature and the ability of betacoronaviruses—the genus to which SARS-CoV-2 belongs—to naturally recombine suggests SARS-CoV-2 was not genetically engineered. For instance, academic literature has noted that in some instances betacoronaviruses have recombined with other viruses in nature and that furin cleavage sites (FCS)—a region in the spike protein that enhances infection—have been identified in naturally occurring coronaviruses in the same genetic location as the FCS in SARS-CoV-2. This suggests that SARS-CoV-2 or a progenitor virus could have acquired its FCS through natural recombination with another virus.

IC analysts do not have higher confidence that SARS-CoV-2 was not genetically engineered because some genetic engineering techniques can make modifications difficult to identify and we have gaps in our knowledge of naturally occurring coronaviruses.

- Some genetic engineering techniques may make genetically modified viruses indistinguishable from natural viruses, according to academic journal articles. For instance, a 2017 dissertation by a WIV student showed that reverse genetic cloning techniques—which are standard techniques used in advanced molecular laboratories—left no trace of genetic modification of SARS-like coronaviruses.

- It will be difficult to increase our confidence that the distinguishing features in SARS-CoV-2 emerged naturally without a better understanding of the diversity of coronaviruses in nature and how often recombination occurs during co-infection of multiple coronaviruses within a particular host. For example, academic literature has indicated that a FCS had previously been inserted into SARS-CoV-1, the causative agent of SARS, complicating differentiation of how such a feature may have appeared.

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Closest Known Relatives of SARS-CoV-2, as of August

As of August, the closest known whole genome match to SARS-CoV-2—around 96 percent identical—is RaTG13, a coronavirus collected from a bat in 2013 by the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), according to academic literature. Scientific literature examining the genome of SARS-CoV-2 has identified at least some similarities to those of other naturally occurring coronaviruses in bats and pangolins, but an immediate precursor virus strain and animal reservoir have not been identified.

VIRUS NAME	PERCENT IDENTITY TO COVID-19 VIRUS	YEAR COLLECTED	LOCATION COLLECTED	ANIMAL COLLECTED
RaTG13	96.2	2013	Yunnan Province, China	Bat
RpYN06	94.5	2020	Yunnan Province, China	Bat
RmYN02	93.3	2019	Yunnan Province, China	Bat
RShSTT200	92.7	2010	Cambodia	Bat
RacCS203	91.5	2020	Thailand	Bat
PrC31	90.7	2018	Yunnan Province, China	Bat
Pangolin-CoV Guangdong	90.1	2019	Guangdong Province, China	Pangolin
ZC45	88.1	2015	Zhejiang Province, China	Bat
ZXC21	88.0	2015	Zhejiang Province, China	Bat
Guangxi pangolin-CoV	85.5	2017, 2018	Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, China	Pangolin
Rc-o319	79.2	2013	Japan	Bat
RaTG15	77.6	2015	Yunnan Province, China	Bat

- The WIV previously created chimeras, or combinations, of SARS-like coronaviruses, but this information does not provide insight into whether SARS-CoV-2 was genetically engineered by the WIV.

No IC analysts assess that SARS-CoV-2 was the result of laboratory adaptation, although some analysts do not have enough information to make this determination. Repeated passage of a closely related virus through animals or cell culture—which we consider laboratory adaptation and not genetic engineering—could result in some features of SARS-CoV-2, according to publicly available information. However, it probably would take years of laboratory adaptation using the appropriate cell types and a virus that is more closely related to SARS-CoV-2 than ones currently known to generate the number of mutations separating SARS-CoV-2 from any known coronavirus strains, judging from scientific journal articles. Such processes would require differentiation and maintenance of primary cells and the development of appropriate animal models.

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China's Lack of Foreknowledge of SARS-CoV-2

The IC assesses China's officials probably did not have foreknowledge that SARS-CoV-2 existed before WIV researchers isolated it after public recognition of the virus in the general population. Accordingly, if the pandemic originated from a laboratory-associated incident, they probably were unaware in the initial months that such an incident had occurred.

- Early in the pandemic, the WIV identified that a new virus was responsible for the outbreak in Wuhan. It is therefore assessed that WIV researchers pivoted to COVID-19-related work to address the outbreak and characterize the virus. These activities suggest that WIV personnel were unaware of the existence of SARS-CoV-2 until the outbreak was underway.

Two Plausible Hypotheses of Pandemic Origin

IC analysts assess that a natural origin and a laboratory-associated incident are both plausible hypotheses for how SARS-CoV-2 first infected humans. Analysts, however, disagree on which is more likely, or whether an assessment can be made at all, given the lack of diagnosticity of the available information. Most agencies are unable to make higher than low confidence assessments for these reasons, and confidence levels are tempered by plausible arguments for the opposing hypothesis. For these hypotheses, IC analysts consider an exposure that occurs during animal sampling activity that supports biological research to be a laboratory-associated incident and not natural contact. What follows is a look at the cases that can be made for these competing hypotheses.

The Case for the Natural Origin Hypothesis

Some IC analysts assess with low confidence that the first human COVID-19 infection most likely was caused by natural exposure to an animal that carried SARS-CoV-2 or a close progenitor virus—a virus that would likely be more than 99 percent similar to SARS-CoV-2.

Four IC elements, the National Intelligence Council, and some analysts at elements that are unable to coalesce around either explanation are among this group. Analysts at these agencies give weight to China's officials' lack of foreknowledge and highlight the precedent of past novel infectious disease outbreaks having zoonotic origins, the wide diversity of animals that are susceptible to SARS-CoV-2 infection, and the range of scenarios—to include animal trafficking, farming, sale, and rescue—in China that enable zoonotic transmission. Although no confirmed animal source of SARS-CoV-2 has been identified, to include a reservoir or intermediate species, analysts that assess the pandemic was due to natural causes note that in many previous zoonotic outbreaks, the identification of animal sources has taken years, and in some cases, animal sources have not been identified.

- These analysts assess that WIV's activities in early 2020 related to SARS-CoV-2 are a strong indicator that the WIV lacked foreknowledge of the virus.

- They also see the potential that a laboratory worker inadvertently was infected while collecting unknown animal specimens to be less likely than an infection occurring through numerous hunters, farmers, merchants, and others who have frequent, natural contact with animals.

- Given China's poor public health infrastructure and the potential for asymptomatic infection, some analysts that lean towards a natural origin argue that China's infectious disease surveillance system would not have been able to detect the SARS-CoV-2 exposure as quickly as a suspected exposure in a laboratory setting.

History of Zoonotic Pathogen Emergence, Conditions in China Ripe for Zoonotic Spillover

Analysts that find the natural zoonotic spillover hypothesis the most likely explanation for the pandemic also note the wide diversity of animals that are susceptible to SARS-CoV-2 infection, range of scenarios—to include animal trafficking, farming, sale, and rescue—in China that would enable zoonotic

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Comparing COVID-19 Pandemic to Past Select Viral Zoonotic Outbreaks

	Location of Emergence	Asymptomatic Infection Common	Reservoir Species and Year Identified	Probable Intermediate Species and Year Identified
COVID-19 (2019–Present)	China	Yes	Unknown	Unknown
Ebola (2014–16)	Guinea	No *(Probably)*	Bats *(Probably)*; N/A	Nonhuman primate *(Probably)*; N/A
MERS (2012)	Saudi Arabia, Jordan	Yes	Bats *(Probably)*; N/A	Dromedary camels; 2013
SARS (2002–04)	China	No *(Probably)*	Horseshoe bats; 2016	Masked palm civets and Raccoon dogs *(Possibly)*; 2003
Nipah (1998–99)	Malaysia	Yes	Fruit bats; 1999	Pigs; 1998
HIV-1 (1970s–Present)	Democratic Republic of Congo *(Probably)*	No *(Probably)*	Chimpanzees *(Probably)*; 1999	N/A

a. HIV is believed to have crossed from chimpanzees to humans in the 1920s; the first documented death occurred in the late 1980s.

transmission, and precedent of novel human infectious disease outbreaks originating from zoonotic transmission. Previous human coronavirus outbreaks, to include SARS-CoV-1 and Middle East Respiratory Syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV), occurred naturally and were linked to animal reservoirs with zoonotic transmission to humans, according to scientific literature.

- Extensive wildlife and livestock farming, wildlife trafficking, and live animal markets in China and historically lax government regulation—and even promotion—of these activities increase the probability that initial transmission occurred along one of these routes.
- Academic literature has revealed Wuhan markets sold live mammals and dozens of species—including raccoon dogs, masked palm civets, and a variety of other mammals, birds, and reptiles—often in poor conditions where viruses can jump among species, facilitating recombination events and the acquisition of novel mutations. SARS-CoV-2 can infect a range of mammals, including cats, dogs, pangolins, minks, raccoon dogs, and a variety of wild and domestic animals, according to academic literature.
- Wider Hubei Province has extensive farming and breeding of animals that are susceptible to SARS-CoV-2, including minks and raccoon dogs.

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These analysts note that there is a precedent for viral vectors to travel long distances in China and cause infection elsewhere because of transportation and trade nodes, thereby widening and complicating the search for the specific zoonotic spillover incident. For instance, the bat coronavirus that is currently the closest known relative to the original SARS-CoV-1 was identified in Yunnan Province, even though the first SARS outbreak detected in humans occurred in Guangdong Province, hundreds of kilometers away.

The Case for the Laboratory-Associated Incident Hypothesis

One IC element assesses with moderate confidence that COVID-19 most likely resulted from a laboratory-associated incident involving WIV or other researchers—either through exposure to the virus during experiments or through sampling. Some analysts at elements that are unable to coalesce around either explanation also assess a laboratory origin with low confidence. These analysts place emphasis on academic articles authored by WIV employees indicating that WIV scientists conducted research on other coronaviruses under what these analysts consider to be inadequate biosafety conditions that could have led to opportunities for a laboratory-associated incident. These analysts also take into account SARS-CoV-2's genetic epidemiology and that the initial recorded COVID-19 clusters occurred only in Wuhan—and that WIV researchers who conducted sampling activity throughout China provided a node for the virus to enter the city.

WIV Research Includes Work With Animals That Carry Relatives of SARS-CoV-2

The analysts that find the laboratory-associated origin theory most likely assess that WIV researchers' inherently risky work with coronaviruses provided numerous opportunities for them to unwittingly become infected with SARS-CoV-2. Although the IC has no indications that WIV research involved SARS-CoV-2 or a close progenitor virus, these analysts note that it is plausible that researchers may have unwittingly exposed themselves to the virus without sequencing it during experiments or sampling activities, possibly resulting in asymptomatic or mild infection. Academic literature indicates that WIV researchers conducted research with bat coronaviruses or collected samples from species that are known to carry close relatives of SARS-CoV-2.

- Based on currently available information, the closest known relatives to SARS-CoV-2 in bats have been identified in Yunnan Province, and researchers bringing samples to laboratories provide a plausible link between these habitats and the city.
- These analysts also note that China's investigations into the pandemic's origin might not uncover evidence of a laboratory-associated incident if it involved only a small number of researchers who did not acknowledge or have knowledge of a potential infection.

WIV Illnesses in Fall 2019 Not Diagnostic

The IC assesses that information indicating that several WIV researchers reported symptoms consistent with COVID-19 in autumn 2019 is not diagnostic of the pandemic's origins. Even if confirmed, hospital admission alone would not be diagnostic of COVID-19 infection.

Biosafety Conditions for Specific Work Could Have Led to an Incident

The analysts that assess COVID-19 most likely originated from a laboratory-associated incident also place emphasis on information suggesting researchers in China used biosafety practices that increased the risk of exposure to viruses. Academic publications suggest that WIV researchers did not use adequate biosafety precautions at least some of the time, increasing the risk of a laboratory-associated incident.

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The Role of the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market

Some scientists and China's public health officials have shifted their view on the role of the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market in the pandemic since early 2020. Some now view the market as a potential site of community spread rather than where the initial human infection may have occurred.

- On January 1, 2020, China's security authorities shut down the market after several workers fell ill in late December 2019. China focused early source tracing on the market and Hubei Province; association with the market was included as part of the early case definition.

- In January 2020, a scientific article that described clinical features of initial COVID-19 infections in China found that some COVID-19 patients did not have any known association with the market. Furthermore, there continues to be conflicting data with some academic articles and preprints noting that phylogenetic analysis of the available data on the earliest cases suggests that the progenitor virus may not have originated from the market.

China's Transparency Key to Determining COVID-19 Origin

The IC judges that closing persistent information gaps on the origins of COVID-19 is very likely to require greater transparency and collaboration from Beijing. The scientific community lacks technical data on a reservoir species, possible intermediate species, and closer relatives to SARS-CoV-2.

Data and Samples From Initial Cases: The global scientific community does not know exactly where, when, or how the first human infection with SARS-CoV-2 occurred. It lacks a complete picture of the initial cases in Wuhan—or potentially elsewhere in China—that would allow it to better understand potential sources of infection or conduct phylogenetic analysis that would help validate both hypotheses.

Information That Would Confirm Natural Outbreak: Searching for a natural reservoir or potential intermediate host requires collecting, isolating, and sequencing viruses from samples taken from potential host species and environments to search for viruses related to SARS-CoV-2, endeavors that require international collaboration, resources, and time.

- Information that the earliest confirmed COVID-19 cases were in individuals or families who spent time in rural regions or who were involved in animal trade or environments that facilitate close human-to-animal interactions could indicate that the virus was circulating within an animal reservoir and a zoonotic spillover event caused the first COVID-19 case in humans.

- However, some transmission pathways are fleeting, meaning an animal acquires a virus and evidence of infection vanishes, particularly if the animals are reared and harvested for agricultural or commercial purposes.

Information That Would Confirm Laboratory-Associated Incident: China's coronavirus research or related information from origins investigations by Beijing or international organizations could provide clear indications of a laboratory-associated incident or at least yield some new insights.

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WIV's Publicly Available Coronavirus Research

IC analysts are examining published research from China for any indicators that would inform our understanding of COVID-19's origins. The WIV and other research groups in China published coronavirus articles in 2020 and 2021, including the discovery of the closest known relative of SARS-CoV-2, but at least some relevant data on coronaviruses of interest has either been unavailable or has not been published.

Although the WIV described the sampling trip to the mineshaft in Mojiang in Yunnan Province where it collected RaTG13 in 2016, it did not explicitly state that RaTG13 was collected from that mine until 2020. Similarly, the WIV collected eight other coronaviruses from the same mine in 2015 that it did not fully disclose until 2021. In some of these instances, however, the WIV has described unpublished work in webinars and interviews prior to publishing.

China Likely To Impede Investigation

The IC judges they will be unable to provide a more definitive explanation for the origin of COVID-19 unless new information allows them to determine the specific pathway for initial natural contact with an animal or to determine that a laboratory in Wuhan was handling SARS-CoV-2 or a close progenitor virus before COVID-19 emerged.

- For instance, Beijing limited the World Health Organization (WHO) investigation team's access to sites.
- In late July, China denounced a WHO plan for future investigations into COVID-19 origins, claiming that the proposal for future investigations was politicized. China's officials publicly rebuked the WHO's plans for a future study of labs in China, saying Beijing would not allow the WHO to engage in the "conspiracy theory."

China is also pushing its narrative that the virus originated outside China.

- Public statements from China's Government have continued to claim the virus originated from imported frozen food, an extremely unlikely theory.
- China's Government continues to spread allegations that the United States created or intentionally spread SARS-CoV-2 to divert attention away from Beijing.

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Annex A: Definitions

Antibody: A protein produced during an immune response to a part of an infectious agent called an antigen.

Backbone: A genetic sequence used as a chassis upon which to build synthetic constructs, such as those used for cloning, protein expression, and production.

Biological weapon: A weapon that uses bacteria, viruses, toxins, fungi, and biochemical/biomolecule agents that can cause death or injury to humans, plants, or animals or destroy materials.

Biosafety: The application of knowledge, techniques, and equipment to prevent personal, laboratory, and environmental exposure to potentially infectious agents or biohazards. Four **Biosafety levels (BSL)** define the containment conditions under which biological agents can be safely manipulated. These standards range from moderate safety requirements for low-risk agents (BSL-1), to the most stringent controls for high-risk agents (BSL-4). China's standards range from P1–4.

Biosecurity: The protection, control of, and accountability for biological agents, toxins, and biological materials and information to prevent unauthorized possession, loss, theft, misuse, diversion, and accidental or intentional release.

Coronavirus: A common type of virus that can infect humans and/or animals. The human illness caused by most coronaviruses usually last a short time and presents symptoms consistent with the "common cold," such as a runny nose, sore throat, cough, and a fever.

COVID-19: An infectious disease caused by the **SARS-CoV-2** virus, which is a betacoronavirus.

Diagnostic information: Information that allows IC analysts to distinguish between hypotheses—in this case, the laboratory origin and natural origin theories.

DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid): A molecule that carries an organism's genetic blueprint for growth, development, function, and reproduction.

Epidemiology: The study of the distribution and determinants of health-related events in specified populations, and the application of this study to prevent and control health problems.

Furin cleavage site (FCS): A region in the spike protein of SARS-CoV-2 that enhances infection.

Gain-of-function: The IC considers this as a research method that involves manipulating an organism's genetic material to impart new biological functions that could enhance virulence or transmissibility (e.g., genetically modifying a virus to expand its host range, transmissibility, or severity of illness). The IC assesses that genetic engineering, genetic modification, and laboratory-adaptation can all be used for gain-of-function experiments, but are not inherently so. We address both genetic engineering and laboratory-adaptation in the body of this assessment; the IC is unaware of an agreed, international definition.

Genetically engineered or genetically modified viruses are intentionally altered, created, or edited using biotechnologies, such as Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeat (CRISPR), DNA recombination, or reverse genetics. These viruses have intentional, targeted edits to the genome designed to achieve specific results, but unintentional genomic changes may also occur.

Genome: The genetic material of an organism. It consists of DNA (and sometimes RNA for viruses).

Genome sequencing: The process of determining the DNA or RNA sequence of an organism's genome, or its "genetic code." An organism's genetic code is the order in which the four nucleotide bases—adenine, cytosine, guanine, and thymine—are arranged to direct the sequence of the 20 different amino acids in the proteins that determine inherited traits.

Intermediate species/host: An organism that can be infected with a pathogen from a resevoir species and

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passes the pathogen to another host species; infection is not sustained in this population.

Laboratory-adapted viruses have undergone natural, random mutations through human-enabled processes in a laboratory—such as repeated passage through animals or cells—that put pressure on the virus to more rapidly evolve. Specific changes to the viral genome are not necessarily anticipated in these processes, though the virus can be expected to gain certain characteristics, like the ability to infect a new species. This is a common technique used in public health research of viruses. We consider directed evolution to be under laboratory adaptation.

Laboratory-associated incidents include incidents that happen in biological research facilities or during research-related sampling activities.

Molecular biology: Study of the molecular basis of activities in and between cells. This includes techniques to amplify or join genetic sequences.

Naturally occurring viruses have not been altered in a laboratory. Viruses commonly undergo random mutations as part of the evolutionary process and can continue to change over time; mutations may enable a virus to adapt to its environment, such as evading host immune responses and promoting viral replication.

Outbreak: A sudden increase in occurrences of a disease in a particular time and place. Outbreaks include **epidemics**, which is a term that is reserved for infectious diseases that occur in a confined geographical area. **Pandemics** are near-global disease outbreaks.

Pangolin: An African and Asian mammal that has a body covered in overlapping scales. Pangolins are a natural reservoir of coronaviruses and researchers are investigating their potential role as an intermediate host for SARS-CoV-2.

Pathogen: A bacterium, virus, or other microorganism that can cause disease.

Phylogenetics: The study of the evolutionary relationships among groups of organisms.

Progenitor virus: A virus that is closely related enough—probably more than 99 percent—to SARS-CoV-2 to have been its direct ancestor or plausible immediate origin of the outbreak. The closest known relative to SARS-CoV-2 is only around 96 percent similar; to put this into context, humans and chimps are around 99 percent similar, demonstrating the significant differences even at this similarity.

RaTG13: A coronavirus with the closest known whole genome to SARS-CoV-2, although it is widely believed to not be a direct ancestor of SARS-CoV-2.

Resevoir species/host: An organism that harbors a pathogen, which is endemic within the population.

RNA (ribonucleic acid): A molecule essential for gene coding, decoding, regulation, and expression. Certain viruses use RNA as a genetic blueprint.

Transmissibility: The measure of new infections initiated by an existing infection.

Virus: A replicating piece of genetic material—DNA or RNA—and associated proteins that use the cellular machinery of a living cell to reproduce.

Wet market: A market where fresh food and live and dead animals, including wildlife, are sold.

Zoonosis: An infection or a disease that is transmissible from animals to humans under natural conditions. A **zoonotic pathogen** may be viral, bacterial, or parasitic, and can sometimes be transmitted through insects, such as mosquitoes.

Zoonotic spillover: An initial infection or disease that is caused by contact between an animal and human under natural conditions.

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Annex B: IC Examination of Open-Source Theories

IC analysts have examined a number of open-source articles from a variety of sources that have raised theories about SARS-CoV-2 and COVID-19's origin. The IC assesses that these theories generally do not provide diagnostic information on COVID-19 origins, and in some cases, are not supported by the information available to us. However, several have drawn on insightful methods or identified potential leads.

Theory of Abnormal Activity at the WIV in Fall 2019

The IC assesses that an assessment about abnormal activity at the WIV in fall 2019 lacks support and does not offer diagnostic insight. The Multi-Agency Collaboration Environment (MACE) published a report assessing that the pandemic began in October 2019 because of a release at the WIV.

- Although the methodology is insightful, the IC has concerns with the small data set and analytic rigor used to derive the group's findings, and our review of information directly contradicts some of its findings.

Theory That SARS-CoV-2 Was a Biological Weapon

The IC assesses that public claims from a Hong Kong virologist that Beijing created SARS-CoV-2 as a biological weapon are inconsistent with available technical information on coronaviruses. We assess that the articles contain several technical inaccuracies and omit key data points.

- Since September 2020, a virologist who worked in a WHO-affiliated laboratory in Hong Kong has publicly stated that Beijing created SARS-CoV-2 from bat coronaviruses and that China's researchers intentionally released it. The scientific community did not peer review these articles and some publicly rejected the articles' claims as scientifically unsound.

Theory That SARS-CoV-2 Was Genetically Engineered

The IC assesses that public claims that some distinguishing features in SARS-CoV-2 are the result of genetic engineering are not diagnostic of genetic engineering. The IC has been evaluating how SARS-CoV-2 could have developed these features and notes that the furin cleavage site (FCS)—a region in the spike protein that enables infection and has been the topic of open-source debate—can also be consistent with a natural origin of the virus.

We do not fully understand the diversity of natural coronaviruses or how often they recombine, suggesting that there are plausible natural means by which these features in SARS-CoV-2 could have emerged beyond what we currently understand.

- For example, the author of an article in April notes the SARS-CoV-2's FCS is unique among known betacoronaviruses. The author argues that such features are rare and so well-adapted for human infection that they are more likely emerged from laboratory work than from natural selection.

- Although an IC review of scientific literature has indicated that no known betacoronaviruses in the same subgenus have this FCS in the same region of the spike protein as SARS-CoV-2, similar FCSs are present in the same region of the spike protein as other naturally occurring coronaviruses, according to scientific articles.

We also do not find credible a now-withdrawn preprint article from two Indian educational institutes posted in January 2020 that asserted SARS-CoV-2 was genetically engineered using sequences from the human immunodeficiency virus. We assess it is unlikely that scientists would have chosen to intentionally engineer the specific sequences that were the focus of the scientific article.

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Theory That SARS-CoV-2 Originated Outside China

We are aware of scientific studies claiming to have found SARS-CoV-2 viral fragments or antibodies in samples taken before November 2019 outside China. However, technical flaws in some of these studies, uncertainties in the methodologies, and in some cases, the lack of a credible review process make us skeptical of their utility in determining the pandemic's origin.

- We assess that the first cluster of confirmed COVID-19 cases arose in Wuhan, China, in late 2019, but we lack insight—and may never have it—on where the first SARS-CoV-2 infection occurred. Although all of the earliest confirmed cases of COVID-19 were documented in China's Hubei Province, where Wuhan is located, according to Western and China's press reports, it is plausible that a traveler came in contact with the virus elsewhere and then went to Wuhan.

- We continue to monitor scientific publications and discuss these issues with experts. Even if the virus is found to have existed outside China before the Wuhan outbreak, credible evidence of human infection would also be necessary to determine if the first COVID-19 outbreak began there.

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Annex C: IC Approach to 90-Day Study

The NIC collaborated closely with the National Counterproliferation Center (NCPC), the National Intelligence Management Council (NIMC), IC agencies, and other USG entities and departments on this assessment. The IC kicked off the 90-day study by outlining the core intelligence questions that would be addressed over lines of effort—collection and analysis. These questions included:

- Did the outbreak begin through contact with infected domestic or wild animals or was it the result of a laboratory-associated incident?
- Was the virus genetically engineered?
- Is SARS-CoV-2 a biological weapon?

Collection: At the kick-off meeting for the 90-day study, the IC discussed core intelligence gaps to drive collection moving forward.

Analysis: The NIC had two separate structured analytic exercises to discuss both the underlying reporting and to strengthen argumentation moving into the drafting phase. Analysts at individual agencies also pursued various structured analytic techniques to build their own assessments.

- During a two-day-long in-person IC-wide **Analysis of Competing Hypothesis (ACH)** analytic exercise in June, analysts determined whether existing reporting was consistent or inconsistent with information in individual reports. This exercise allowed analysts to determine that most reporting was consistent with both hypotheses and the reporting that was inconsistent was deemed to be not credible.
- Before the start of drafting, the NIC hosted an IC-wide **Team A/Team B** analytic exercise to explore how the IC could strengthen either hypothesis through a debate style format. Agencies pulled from these conversations—along with the work conducted during and before the study—to solidify their consensus positions.

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Annex D: Outside Review

The NIC conducted four rounds of outside review of the draft assessment. These sessions provided valuable feedback that we incorporated into the assessment. The NIC made some organizational changes in response to comments; comments included:

- Emphasize points of agreement.
- Provide additional definitions in the lexicon and ensure technical or intelligence jargon is explicitly explained.

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Annex E: Questions

Answers to the following questions would help us better evaluate hypotheses related to the origins of COVID-19:

What additional information—to include timing, location, relevant animal exposures, occupational information, and clinical samples—is there on the earliest cases of COVID-19?

How were early cases investigated? What questions or tools were utilized for tracing contacts and contacts of those contacts?

What direct or indirect indicators of COVID-19 clusters is China aware of from early in the outbreak? This may include things like hospital occupancy rates or efforts to triage medical care outside of hospital facilities.

What insight can China provide on the search for the reservoir and potential intermediate species of the COVID-19 virus?

What insight can China provide on the search for the identification of a progenitor virus? Have any leading candidates or regions for spillover been identified?

What information, data, and/or samples does China have on wildlife or other animals present in the following markets in Wuhan:

- Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market
- Qiyimen Live Animal Market
- Baishazhou Market
- Dijiao Outdoor Pet Market

What information, data, and/or samples does China have on wildlife present in the other markets, wildlife rescue centers, and/or farms in Wuhan, across Hubei, in neighboring provinces, or in locations where live animals in Hubei Province are sourced from?

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA)
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOIA Request No.:1585506,1585510
Civil Action No.: 23-cv-1768

Total Withheld Page(s) = 136

Bates Page Reference	Reason for Withholding (i.e., exemptions with coded rationale, duplicate, sealed by order of court, etc.)
FBI(23-cv-1768)-109	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(6)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(C)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-110	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-111	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI, per DOS, per NGA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-112 - FBI(23-cv-1768)-114	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-115	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI, per NGA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-116	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-117 - FBI(23-cv-1768)-118	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI, per NGA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-119	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI, per DOS, per NGA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI, per DIA; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-120 - FBI(23-cv-1768)-121	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI, per NGA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-122 - FBI(23-cv-1768)-124	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-125 - FBI(23-cv-1768)-126	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI, per NGA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-127	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-128	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI, per DOS, per DIA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI, per DIA; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-129	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI, per NGA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-130	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI, per DOS; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(5) per DOS; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI

FBI(23-cv-1768)-131 - FBI(23-cv-1768)-135	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-136	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI, per NGA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-137	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-138	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI, per DIA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI, per DIA; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-139	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI, per NGA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-140 - FBI(23-cv-1768)-142	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-144	(b)(1) per ODNI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(5)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-2,-3,-4,-5,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-145	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(5)-1 per FBI;(b)(6)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(C)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-146	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(5)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-147	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI, per DOS, per NGA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(5)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-148 - FBI(23-cv-1768)-150	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(5)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-151	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI, per NGA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(5)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-152	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(5)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-153 - FBI(23-cv-1768)-154	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI, per NGA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(5)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-155	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI, per DOS, per NGA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(5)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-156 - FBI(23-cv-1768)-157	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI, per NGA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(5)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-158 - FBI(23-cv-1768)-160	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(5)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-161 - FBI(23-cv-1768)-162	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI, per NGA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(5)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-163	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(5)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI

FBI(23-cv-1768)-164	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI, per DOS, per DIA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI, per DIA; (b)(5)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-165	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI, per NGA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(5)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-166	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI, per DOS; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(5)-1 per FBI, per DOS; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-167 - FBI(23-cv-1768)-171	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(5)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-172	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI, per NGA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(5)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-173	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(5)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-174	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI, per DIA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI, per DIA; (b)(5)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-175	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI, per NGA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(5)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-176 - FBI(23-cv-1768)-183	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(5)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-184 - FBI(23-cv-1768)-185	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI, per DIA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI, per DIA; (b)(5)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-186- FBI(23-cv-1768)-213	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(5)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-214	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI, per DIA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI, per DIA; (b)(5)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-215	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI, per NGA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(5)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-216 - FBI(23-cv-1768)-218	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(5)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-219	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI, per NGA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(5)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-233 - FBI(23-cv-1768)-234	(b)(1)-1 per FBI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI; (b)(5)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-235	(b)(1)-1 per FBI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI; (b)(5)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-5,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-236 - FBI(23-cv-1768)-237	(b)(1)-1 per FBI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI; (b)(5)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-241	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per WHCO; (b)(3)-5 per FBI; (b)(5) per WHCO; (b)(6)-1

	per FBI; (b)(7)(C)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-242	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per WHCO, per NGA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI; (b)(5) per WHCO; (b)(7)(E)-4,-5,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-243	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per WHCO, per DIA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per DIA; (b)(5) per WHCO; (b)(7)(D)-5 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-5,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-244	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per WHCO; (b)(3)-5 per FBI; (b)(5) per WHCO; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-245	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per WHCO; (b)(3)-5 per FBI; (b)(5) per WHCO; (b)(7)(E)-4,-5,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-246 - FBI(23-cv-1768)-247	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per WHCO, per NGA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI; (b)(5) per WHCO; (b)(7)(E)-4,-5,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-248	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per WHCO, per NGA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI; (b)(5) per WHCO; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-249	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per WHCO; (b)(3)-5 per FBI; (b)(5) per WHCO; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-250	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per WHCO, per NGA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI; (b)(5) per WHCO; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-251	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per WHCO, per NGA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI; (b)(5) per WHCO; (b)(7)(E)-4,-5,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-252	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per WHCO, per NGA, per DIA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per DIA; (b)(5) per WHCO; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-253	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per WHCO, per DIA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per DIA; (b)(5) per WHCO; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-254	(b)(1)-1 per FBI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI; (b)(6)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(C)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-5,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-255	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per DIA, DOS, NGA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI; (b)(7)(D)-5 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-5,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-256	(b)(1)-1 per FBI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI; (b)(6)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(C)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-5,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-257 - FBI(23-cv-1768)-258	(b)(1)-1 per FBI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-259 - FBI(23-cv-1768)-260	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per DIA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI;(b)(7)(E)-4,-5,-8 per FBI
FBI(23-cv-1768)-261	(b)(1)-1 per FBI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI;(b)(7)(E)-4,-5,-8 per FBI

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X For this Page X
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DECLASSIFIED BY [redacted]/NSICG
ON 7/31/2024

b6-1
b7C-1

[redacted] (FBI)

From: MYERS, M. A. (DO) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, August 25, 2021 4:16 PM
To: WRAY, CHRISTOPHER (DO) (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (DO) (OGA); ABBATE, PAUL (DO) (FBI); [redacted] (DO) (FBI)
Subject: FW: Updated NICA Draft and Information --- [redacted]

b6-1
b7C-1

b3-5 per ODNI,FBI
b7E-4,8

Classification: TOP SECRET//HCS-P/SI-G//ORCON/NOFORN/[redacted]

Classified By: [redacted]
Derived From: Multiple Sources
Declassify On: 20461231
==========

Sir,

This version has the areas of interest highlighted by [redacted] and an explanation of next steps.

V/R,

--mo

From: [redacted] (FBI) [redacted]
Sent: Wednesday, August 25, 2021 11:34 AM
To: [redacted] (FBI) [redacted]; MYERS, M. A. (DO) (FBI) [redacted]; [redacted] (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (FBI) [redacted] (FBI) [redacted] (FBI) [redacted] (FBI) [redacted]
Subject: Updated NICA Draft and Information --- [redacted]

b6-1
b7C-1
b7E-2,3

b3 per ODNI

Classification: TOP SECRET//HCS-P/SI-G//ORCON/NOFORN/[redacted]

Classified By: [redacted]
Derived From: Multiple Sources
Declassify On: 20461231
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b3-5 per ODNI,FBI
b5-1
b6-1
b7C-1
b7E-2,4,8

[redacted]/EAD Myers/[redacted]

[redacted]

(U) (TS//[redacted])[redacted]

b1-1 b3-5 b7E-4,5,8

(U) (TS/[redacted]

b1-1 b3-5 b7E-4,5,8

(U//~~FOUO~~) COVID-19 Pandemic Origins

(U) (TS/[redacted]

b1-1 b3-5 b7E-4,5,8

- (U) (TS/[redacted]

b1-1 b3-5 b7E-4,5,8

(U) [a] [b] (TS/[redacted]

b1-1 b3-5 b7E-4,5,8

(U) [d] (TS/[redacted]

b1-1 b3-5 b7E-4,5,8

(U) (S) (X[redacted]

b1-1 b3-5 b6-1 b7C-1 b7E-4,8

CLASSIFIED BY: [redacted] | DERIVED FROM: Multiple Sources | DECLASSIFY ON: 50X1-HUM

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) • (TS//

b1-1
b3-5
b7D-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) • (TS//

b1-1
b3-5
b7D-5
b7E-4,5,8

•

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U//~~FOUO~~)

(U) (TS//

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

[i]

(U) • (S//[redacted]//~~OC-USGOV/NF~~)

b1-1
b3-5
b7D-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) • (S//~~NF~~)

b1-1
b3-5
b7D-5
b7E-4,5,8

[h]

[j]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,8

[redacted][26]

b1-1
b3-5
b7D-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) (S//~~NF~~) **Analysis of Alternatives:** [redacted]

b1-1
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b7E-4,5,8

(U) (S//~~NF~~) **Outlook:** [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) [redacted]

b7E-2,4,5,8

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,8

(U) Endnotes

[1] (U//~~FOUO~~) FBI | FD-1057 | | | [redacted]
b1-1
b3-5
b6-2
b7C-2
b7D-5
b7E-1,4,5,8

[2] (U//~~FOUO~~) FBI | FD-1057 | | | [redacted]
b1-1
b3-5
b6-2
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b7D-5
b7E-1,4,5,8

(U) [3] (S//~~NF~~) FBI | FD-1057 | | | [redacted]

(U) SECRET//~~NOFORN~~ | [redacted]

(U) [4] (TS// [redacted]
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b6-3
b7C-3
b7D-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) [5] (TS// [redacted]
b1-1
b3-5
b7D-5
b7E-4,5,8

[6] (U) [redacted]
b1-1
b3-5
b6-3
b7C-3
b7D-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) [7] (TS// [redacted]

[8] (U//~~FOUO~~) FBI | FD-1057 | | | [redacted]
b1-1
b3-5
b6-2,4
b7C-2,4
b7D-5
b7E-1,4,5,8

[9] (U//~~FOUO~~) FBI | FD-1057 | | | [redacted].
b1-1
b3-5
b6-2,4
b7C-2,4
b7D-5
b7E-1,4,5,8

[10] (U//~~FOUO~~) FBI | FD-1057 | | | [redacted]

(U) [11] (TS// [redacted]
b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) [12] (TS// [redacted]
b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,8

(U) [13] (TS//[redacted]

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b3-5
b7D-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) [14] (S//~~NF~~) FBI | IIR [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7D-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) SECRET//~~NOFORN~~ | SECRET//~~NOFORN~~ | [redacted]

(U) [redacted].

(U) [15] (TS//[redacted]

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b3-5
b7D-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) [16] (S//~~NF~~) FBI | FD-1023 | [redacted]

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b1-1
b3-5
b7D-5
b7E-1,4,5,8

(U) [17] (TS//[redacted]

(U) [18] (TS//[redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) [19] (TS//[redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

[20] (U//~~FOUO~~) FBI | FD-1057 | [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b6-2
b7C-2
b7D-5
b7E-1,4,5,8

[redacted] SECRET//~~NOFORN~~ (U)

(U) [21] (TS//[redacted]

[22] (U//~~FOUO~~) FBI | FD-1057 | [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b6-2
b7C-2
b7D-5
b7E-1,4,5,8

(U) [23] (S//~~NF~~) FBI | FD-1023 | [redacted]

(U) SECRET//~~NOFORN~~ | SECRET//~~NOFORN~~ (U) (U)

(U) [24] (S[redacted]//~~OC-USGOV/NF~~) [redacted] | SECRET//[redacted]

(U) [redacted]//~~ORCON-USGOV/NOFORN~~ | SECRET//[redacted]//~~ORCON-USGOV/NOFORN~~

b1-1
b3-5
b6-2
b7C-2
b7D-5
b7E-1,4,5,8

(U) [25] (S//~~NF~~) FBI | FD-1023 | [redacted]

(U) [redacted] SECRET//~~NOFORN~~ | SECRET//~~NOFORN~~ | [redacted]

(U) [redacted]

(U) [26] (S//~~NF~~) FBI | IIR [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7D-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) SECRET//~~NOFORN~~ | SECRET//~~NOFORN~~ | [redacted]

(U)

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,8

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,8

b1-1
b3-5
b7D-5
b7E-4,5,8

[redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,8

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERER OTHERWISE
SHOWN

DATE 7/26/2024
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG[redacted]
REASON: 1.4(C)
DECLASSIFY ON 12/31/2049

b1-1
b3-5
b6-1
b7C-1
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION TECHNICAL ANALYSIS BULLETIN

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(U) [9] (TS//[redacted]) *Analyst Note*: Per the abovementioned [redacted], the USIC remains divided in its judgment of which transmission path is most probable, but nearly all agencies continue to judge the virus was not genetically engineered.

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OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL

Updated Assessment on

COVID-19 ORIGINS

24-cv-2684 (FBI)-1

Updated Assessment on COVID-19 Origins

Key Takeaways

Scope Note: This assessment responds to the President's request that the Intelligence Community (IC) update its previous judgments on the origins of COVID-19. It also identifies areas for possible additional research. Annexes include a lexicon, additional details on methodology, and comments from outside experts. This assessment is based on information through August 2021.

The IC assesses that SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, probably emerged and infected humans through an initial small-scale exposure that occurred no later than November 2019 with the first known cluster of COVID-19 cases arising in Wuhan, China in December 2019. In addition, the IC was able to reach broad agreement on several other key issues. We judge the virus was not developed as a biological weapon. Most agencies also assess with low confidence that SARS-CoV-2 probably was not genetically engineered; however, two agencies believe there was not sufficient evidence to make an assessment either way. Finally, the IC assesses China's officials did not have foreknowledge of the virus before the initial outbreak of COVID-19 emerged.

After examining all available intelligence reporting and other information, though, the IC remains divided on the most likely origin of COVID-19. All agencies assess that two hypotheses are plausible: natural exposure to an infected animal and a laboratory-associated incident.

- Four IC elements and the National Intelligence Council assess with low confidence that the initial SARS-CoV-2 infection was most likely caused by natural exposure to an animal infected with it or a close progenitor virus—a virus that probably would be more than 99 percent similar to SARS-CoV-2. These analysts give weight to China's officials' lack of foreknowledge, the numerous vectors for natural exposure, and other factors.

- One IC element assesses with moderate confidence that the first human infection with SARS-CoV-2 most likely was the result of a laboratory-associated incident, probably involving experimentation, animal handling, or sampling by the Wuhan Institute of Virology. These analysts give weight to the inherently risky nature of work on coronaviruses.

- Analysts at three IC elements remain unable to coalesce around either explanation without additional information, with some analysts favoring natural origin, others a laboratory origin, and some seeing the hypotheses as equally likely.

- Variations in analytic views largely stem from differences in how agencies weigh intelligence reporting and scientific publications and intelligence and scientific gaps.

The IC judges they will be unable to provide a more definitive explanation for the origin of COVID-19 unless new information allows them to determine the specific pathway for initial natural contact with an animal or to determine that a laboratory in Wuhan was handling SARS-CoV-2 or a close progenitor virus before COVID-19 emerged.

- The IC—and the global scientific community—lacks clinical samples or a complete understanding of epidemiological data from the earliest COVID-19 cases. If we obtain information on the earliest cases that identified a location of interest or occupational exposure, it may alter our evaluation of hypotheses.

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China's cooperation most likely would be needed to reach a conclusive assessment of the origins of COVID-19. Beijing, however, continues to hinder the global investigation, resist sharing information, and blame other countries, including the United States. These actions reflect, in part, China's government's own uncertainty about where an investigation could lead as well as its frustration the international community is using the issue to exert political pressure on China.

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IC Assessments of COVID-19 Origins

AREAS OF BROAD AGREEMENT

- First known cluster of COVID-19 cases emerged in Wuhan, China in December 2019
- Virus not developed as a biological weapon
- Virus not genetically engineered
- China's officials unaware of virus before pandemic emerged



TWO PLAUSIBLE HYPOTHESES ON INITIAL HUMAN EXPOSURE

- Natural transmission from animal to human
- Laboratory-associated incident
- Evidence not strongly diagnostic of either hypothesis



CHINA'S COOPERATION KEY TO UNDERSTANDING ORIGINS

- Beijing's lack of cooperation on origins not diagnostic of either hypothesis
- Numerous information gaps, particularly related to technical data

Introduction

The IC has prepared several assessments examining the origins of COVID-19. Analysts have focused on whether SARS-CoV-2, the causative virus of COVID-19, was genetically engineered—particularly as a biological weapon—was transmitted to humans naturally or transmitted due to a laboratory-associated incident, perhaps during sampling or experimentation. China's reaction to and handling of the pandemic have given analysts insights into these issues, but Beijing's actions have also impeded the global scientific community and our ability to confidently determine how the virus first infected humans.

SARS-CoV-2 Probably Not a Biological Weapon

The IC assesses China did not develop SARS-CoV-2 as a biological weapon.

- We remain skeptical of allegations that SARS-CoV-2 was a biological weapon because they are supported by scientifically invalid claims, their proponents do not have direct access to the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), or their proponents are suspected of spreading disinformation. [*See appendix B.*]

Most Analysts Assess SARS-CoV-2 Not Genetically Engineered

Most IC analysts assess with low confidence that SARS-CoV-2 was not genetically engineered. Their assessment is based on technical analysis of SARS-CoV-2 and the IC's growing understanding of traits and the potential for recombination in other coronaviruses. Two agencies believe there is not sufficient evidence to make an assessment either way.

- As of August 2021, we still have not observed genetic signatures in SARS-CoV-2 that would be diagnostic of genetic engineering, according to the IC's understanding of the virus. Similarly, we have not identified any existing coronavirus strains that could have plausibly served as a backbone if SARS-CoV-2 had been genetically engineered.

- Our growing understanding of the similarities of SARS-CoV-2 to other coronaviruses in nature and the ability of betacoronaviruses—the genus to which SARS-CoV-2 belongs—to naturally recombine suggests SARS-CoV-2 was not genetically engineered. For instance, academic literature has noted that in some instances betacoronaviruses have recombined with other viruses in nature and that furin cleavage sites (FCS)—a region in the spike protein that enhances infection—have been identified in naturally occurring coronaviruses in the same genetic location as the FCS in SARS-CoV-2. This suggests that SARS-CoV-2 or a progenitor virus could have acquired its FCS through natural recombination with another virus.

IC analysts do not have higher confidence that SARS-CoV-2 was not genetically engineered because some genetic engineering techniques can make modifications difficult to identify and we have gaps in our knowledge of naturally occurring coronaviruses.

- Some genetic engineering techniques may make genetically modified viruses indistinguishable from natural viruses, according to academic journal articles. For instance, a 2017 dissertation by a WIV student showed that reverse genetic cloning techniques—which are standard techniques used in advanced molecular laboratories—left no trace of genetic modification of SARS-like coronaviruses.

- It will be difficult to increase our confidence that the distinguishing features in SARS-CoV-2 emerged naturally without a better understanding of the diversity of coronaviruses in nature and how often recombination occurs during co-infection of multiple coronaviruses within a particular host. For example, academic literature has indicated that a FCS had previously been inserted into SARS-CoV-1, the causative agent of SARS, complicating differentiation of how such a feature may have appeared.

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Closest Known Relatives of SARS-CoV-2, as of August

As of August, the closest known whole genome match to SARS-CoV-2—around 96 percent identical—is RaTG13, a coronavirus collected from a bat in 2013 by the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), according to academic literature. Scientific literature examining the genome of SARS-CoV-2 has identified at least some similarities to those of other naturally occurring coronaviruses in bats and pangolins, but an immediate precursor virus strain and animal reservoir have not been identified.

VIRUS NAME	PERCENT IDENTITY TO COVID-19 VIRUS	YEAR COLLECTED	LOCATION COLLECTED	ANIMAL COLLECTED
RaTG13	96.2	2013	Yunnan Province, China	Bat
RpYN06	94.5	2020	Yunnan Province, China	Bat
RmYN02	93.3	2019	Yunnan Province, China	Bat
RShSTT200	92.7	2010	Cambodia	Bat
RacCS203	91.5	2020	Thailand	Bat
PrC31	90.7	2018	Yunnan Province, China	Bat
Pangolin-CoV Guangdong	90.1	2019	Guangdong Province, China	Pangolin
ZC45	88.1	2015	Zhejiang Province, China	Bat
ZXC21	88.0	2015	Zhejiang Province, China	Bat
Guangxi pangolin-CoV	85.5	2017, 2018	Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, China	Pangolin
Rc-o319	79.2	2013	Japan	Bat
RaTG15	77.6	2015	Yunnan Province, China	Bat

- The WIV previously created chimeras, or combinations, of SARS-like coronaviruses, but this information does not provide insight into whether SARS-CoV-2 was genetically engineered by the WIV.

No IC analysts assess that SARS-CoV-2 was the result of laboratory adaptation, although some analysts do not have enough information to make this determination. Repeated passage of a closely related virus through animals or cell culture—which we consider laboratory adaptation and not genetic engineering—could result in some features of SARS-CoV-2, according to publicly available information. However, it probably would take years of laboratory adaptation using the appropriate cell types and a virus that is more closely related to SARS-CoV-2 than ones currently known to generate the number of mutations separating SARS-CoV-2 from any known coronavirus strains, judging from scientific journal articles. Such processes would require differentiation and maintenance of primary cells and the development of appropriate animal models.

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China's Lack of Foreknowledge of SARS-CoV-2

The IC assesses China's officials probably did not have foreknowledge that SARS-CoV-2 existed before WIV researchers isolated it after public recognition of the virus in the general population. Accordingly, if the pandemic originated from a laboratory-associated incident, they probably were unaware in the initial months that such an incident had occurred.

- Early in the pandemic, the WIV identified that a new virus was responsible for the outbreak in Wuhan. It is therefore assessed that WIV researchers pivoted to COVID-19-related work to address the outbreak and characterize the virus. These activities suggest that WIV personnel were unaware of the existence of SARS-CoV-2 until the outbreak was underway.

Two Plausible Hypotheses of Pandemic Origin

IC analysts assess that a natural origin and a laboratory-associated incident are both plausible hypotheses for how SARS-CoV-2 first infected humans. Analysts, however, disagree on which is more likely, or whether an assessment can be made at all, given the lack of diagnosticity of the available information. Most agencies are unable to make higher than low confidence assessments for these reasons, and confidence levels are tempered by plausible arguments for the opposing hypothesis. For these hypotheses, IC analysts consider an exposure that occurs during animal sampling activity that supports biological research to be a laboratory-associated incident and not natural contact. What follows is a look at the cases that can be made for these competing hypotheses.

The Case for the Natural Origin Hypothesis

Some IC analysts assess with low confidence that the first human COVID-19 infection most likely was caused by natural exposure to an animal that carried SARS-CoV-2 or a close progenitor virus—a virus that would likely be more than 99 percent similar to SARS-CoV-2.

Four IC elements, the National Intelligence Council, and some analysts at elements that are unable to coalesce around either explanation are among this group. Analysts at these agencies give weight to China's officials' lack of foreknowledge and highlight the precedent of past novel infectious disease outbreaks having zoonotic origins, the wide diversity of animals that are susceptible to SARS-CoV-2 infection, and the range of scenarios—to include animal trafficking, farming, sale, and rescue—in China that enable zoonotic transmission. Although no confirmed animal source of SARS-CoV-2 has been identified, to include a reservoir or intermediate species, analysts that assess the pandemic was due to natural causes note that in many previous zoonotic outbreaks, the identification of animal sources has taken years, and in some cases, animal sources have not been identified.

- These analysts assess that WIV's activities in early 2020 related to SARS-CoV-2 are a strong indicator that the WIV lacked foreknowledge of the virus.

- They also see the potential that a laboratory worker inadvertently was infected while collecting unknown animal specimens to be less likely than an infection occurring through numerous hunters, farmers, merchants, and others who have frequent, natural contact with animals.

- Given China's poor public health infrastructure and the potential for asymptomatic infection, some analysts that lean towards a natural origin argue that China's infectious disease surveillance system would not have been able to detect the SARS-CoV-2 exposure as quickly as a suspected exposure in a laboratory setting.

History of Zoonotic Pathogen Emergence, Conditions in China Ripe for Zoonotic Spillover

Analysts that find the natural zoonotic spillover hypothesis the most likely explanation for the pandemic also note the wide diversity of animals that are susceptible to SARS-CoV-2 infection, range of scenarios—to include animal trafficking, farming, sale, and rescue—in China that would enable zoonotic

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Comparing COVID-19 Pandemic to Past Select Viral Zoonotic Outbreaks

	Location of Emergence	Asymptomatic Infection Common	Reservoir Species and Year Identified	Probable Intermediate Species and Year Identified
COVID-19 *(2019–Present)*	China	Yes	Unknown	Unknown
Ebola *(2014–16)*	Guinea	No *(Probably)*	Bats *(Probably)*; N/A	Nonhuman primate *(Probably)*; N/A
MERS *(2012)*	Saudi Arabia, Jordan	Yes	Bats *(Probably)*; N/A	Dromedary camels; 2013
SARS *(2002–04)*	China	No *(Probably)*	Horseshoe bats; 2016	Masked palm civets and Raccoon dogs *(Possibly)*; 2003
Nipah *(1998–99)*	Malaysia	Yes	Fruit bats; 1999	Pigs; 1998
HIV-1 *(1970s–Present)*	Democratic Republic of Congo *(Probably)*	No *(Probably)*	Chimpanzees *(Probably)*; 1999	N/A

a. HIV is believed to have crossed from chimpanzees to humans in the 1920s; the first documented death occurred in the late 1980s.

transmission, and precedent of novel human infectious disease outbreaks originating from zoonotic transmission. Previous human coronavirus outbreaks, to include SARS-CoV-1 and Middle East Respiratory Syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV), occurred naturally and were linked to animal reservoirs with zoonotic transmission to humans, according to scientific literature.

- Extensive wildlife and livestock farming, wildlife trafficking, and live animal markets in China and historically lax government regulation—and even promotion—of these activities increase the probability that initial transmission occurred along one of these routes.
- Academic literature has revealed Wuhan markets sold live mammals and dozens of species—including raccoon dogs, masked palm civets, and a variety of other mammals, birds, and reptiles—often in poor conditions where viruses can jump among species, facilitating recombination events and the acquisition of novel mutations. SARS-CoV-2 can infect a range of mammals, including cats, dogs, pangolins, minks, raccoon dogs, and a variety of wild and domestic animals, according to academic literature.
- Wider Hubei Province has extensive farming and breeding of animals that are susceptible to SARS-CoV-2, including minks and raccoon dogs.

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These analysts note that there is a precedent for viral vectors to travel long distances in China and cause infection elsewhere because of transportation and trade nodes, thereby widening and complicating the search for the specific zoonotic spillover incident. For instance, the bat coronavirus that is currently the closest known relative to the original SARS-CoV-1 was identified in Yunnan Province, even though the first SARS outbreak detected in humans occurred in Guangdong Province, hundreds of kilometers away.

The Case for the Laboratory-Associated Incident Hypothesis

One IC element assesses with moderate confidence that COVID-19 most likely resulted from a laboratory-associated incident involving WIV or other researchers—either through exposure to the virus during experiments or through sampling. Some analysts at elements that are unable to coalesce around either explanation also assess a laboratory origin with low confidence. These analysts place emphasis on academic articles authored by WIV employees indicating that WIV scientists conducted research on other coronaviruses under what these analysts consider to be inadequate biosafety conditions that could have led to opportunities for a laboratory-associated incident. These analysts also take into account SARS-CoV-2's genetic epidemiology and that the initial recorded COVID-19 clusters occurred only in Wuhan—and that WIV researchers who conducted sampling activity throughout China provided a node for the virus to enter the city.

WIV Research Includes Work With Animals That Carry Relatives of SARS-CoV-2

The analysts that find the laboratory-associated origin theory most likely assess that WIV researchers' inherently risky work with coronaviruses provided numerous opportunities for them to unwittingly become infected with SARS-CoV-2. Although the IC has no indications that WIV research involved SARS-CoV-2 or a close progenitor virus, these analysts note that it is plausible that researchers may have unwittingly exposed themselves to the virus without sequencing it during experiments or sampling activities, possibly resulting in asymptomatic or mild infection. Academic literature indicates that WIV researchers conducted research with bat coronaviruses or collected samples from species that are known to carry close relatives of SARS-CoV-2.

- Based on currently available information, the closest known relatives to SARS-CoV-2 in bats have been identified in Yunnan Province, and researchers bringing samples to laboratories provide a plausible link between these habitats and the city.

- These analysts also note that China's investigations into the pandemic's origin might not uncover evidence of a laboratory-associated incident if it involved only a small number of researchers who did not acknowledge or have knowledge of a potential infection.

WIV Illnesses in Fall 2019 Not Diagnostic

The IC assesses that information indicating that several WIV researchers reported symptoms consistent with COVID-19 in autumn 2019 is not diagnostic of the pandemic's origins. Even if confirmed, hospital admission alone would not be diagnostic of COVID-19 infection.

Biosafety Conditions for Specific Work Could Have Led to an Incident

The analysts that assess COVID-19 most likely originated from a laboratory-associated incident also place emphasis on information suggesting researchers in China used biosafety practices that increased the risk of exposure to viruses. Academic publications suggest that WIV researchers did not use adequate biosafety precautions at least some of the time, increasing the risk of a laboratory-associated incident.

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The Role of the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market

Some scientists and China's public health officials have shifted their view on the role of the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market in the pandemic since early 2020. Some now view the market as a potential site of community spread rather than where the initial human infection may have occurred.

- On January 1, 2020, China's security authorities shut down the market after several workers fell ill in late December 2019. China focused early source tracing on the market and Hubei Province; association with the market was included as part of the early case definition.
- In January 2020, a scientific article that described clinical features of initial COVID-19 infections in China found that some COVID-19 patients did not have any known association with the market. Furthermore, there continues to be conflicting data with some academic articles and preprints noting that phylogenetic analysis of the available data on the earliest cases suggests that the progenitor virus may not have originated from the market.

China's Transparency Key to Determining COVID-19 Origin

The IC judges that closing persistent information gaps on the origins of COVID-19 is very likely to require greater transparency and collaboration from Beijing. The scientific community lacks technical data on a reservoir species, possible intermediate species, and closer relatives to SARS-CoV-2.

Data and Samples From Initial Cases: The global scientific community does not know exactly where, when, or how the first human infection with SARS-CoV-2 occurred. It lacks a complete picture of the initial cases in Wuhan—or potentially elsewhere in China—that would allow it to better understand potential sources of infection or conduct phylogenetic analysis that would help validate both hypotheses.

Information That Would Confirm Natural Outbreak: Searching for a natural reservoir or potential intermediate host requires collecting, isolating, and sequencing viruses from samples taken from potential host species and environments to search for viruses related to SARS-CoV-2, endeavors that require international collaboration, resources, and time.

- Information that the earliest confirmed COVID-19 cases were in individuals or families who spent time in rural regions or who were involved in animal trade or environments that facilitate close human-to-animal interactions could indicate that the virus was circulating within an animal reservoir and a zoonotic spillover event caused the first COVID-19 case in humans.
- However, some transmission pathways are fleeting, meaning an animal acquires a virus and evidence of infection vanishes, particularly if the animals are reared and harvested for agricultural or commercial purposes.

Information That Would Confirm Laboratory-Associated Incident: China's coronavirus research or related information from origins investigations by Beijing or international organizations could provide clear indications of a laboratory-associated incident or at least yield some new insights.

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WIV's Publicly Available Coronavirus Research

IC analysts are examining published research from China for any indicators that would inform our understanding of COVID-19's origins. The WIV and other research groups in China published coronavirus articles in 2020 and 2021, including the discovery of the closest known relative of SARS-CoV-2, but at least some relevant data on coronaviruses of interest has either been unavailable or has not been published.

Although the WIV described the sampling trip to the mineshaft in Mojiang in Yunnan Province where it collected RaTG13 in 2016, it did not explicitly state that RaTG13 was collected from that mine until 2020. Similarly, the WIV collected eight other coronaviruses from the same mine in 2015 that it did not fully disclose until 2021. In some of these instances, however, the WIV has described unpublished work in webinars and interviews prior to publishing.

China Likely To Impede Investigation

The IC judges they will be unable to provide a more definitive explanation for the origin of COVID-19 unless new information allows them to determine the specific pathway for initial natural contact with an animal or to determine that a laboratory in Wuhan was handling SARS-CoV-2 or a close progenitor virus before COVID-19 emerged.

- For instance, Beijing limited the World Health Organization (WHO) investigation team's access to sites.
- In late July, China denounced a WHO plan for future investigations into COVID-19 origins, claiming that the proposal for future investigations was politicized. China's officials publicly rebuked the WHO's plans for a future study of labs in China, saying Beijing would not allow the WHO to engage in the "conspiracy theory."

China is also pushing its narrative that the virus originated outside China.

- Public statements from China's Government have continued to claim the virus originated from imported frozen food, an extremely unlikely theory.
- China's Government continues to spread allegations that the United States created or intentionally spread SARS-CoV-2 to divert attention away from Beijing.

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Annex A: Definitions

Antibody: A protein produced during an immune response to a part of an infectious agent called an antigen.

Backbone: A genetic sequence used as a chassis upon which to build synthetic constructs, such as those used for cloning, protein expression, and production.

Biological weapon: A weapon that uses bacteria, viruses, toxins, fungi, and biochemical/biomolecule agents that can cause death or injury to humans, plants, or animals or destroy materials.

Biosafety: The application of knowledge, techniques, and equipment to prevent personal, laboratory, and environmental exposure to potentially infectious agents or biohazards. Four **Biosafety levels (BSL)** define the containment conditions under which biological agents can be safely manipulated. These standards range from moderate safety requirements for low-risk agents (BSL-1), to the most stringent controls for high-risk agents (BSL-4). China's standards range from P1--4.

Biosecurity: The protection, control of, and accountability for biological agents, toxins, and biological materials and information to prevent unauthorized possession, loss, theft, misuse, diversion, and accidental or intentional release.

Coronavirus: A common type of virus that can infect humans and/or animals. The human illness caused by most coronaviruses usually last a short time and presents symptoms consistent with the "common cold," such as a runny nose, sore throat, cough, and a fever.

COVID-19: An infectious disease caused by the **SARS-CoV-2** virus, which is a betacoronavirus.

Diagnostic information: Information that allows IC analysts to distinguish between hypotheses—in this case, the laboratory origin and natural origin theories.

DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid): A molecule that carries an organism's genetic blueprint for growth, development, function, and reproduction.

Epidemiology: The study of the distribution and determinants of health-related events in specified populations, and the application of this study to prevent and control health problems.

Furin cleavage site (FCS): A region in the spike protein of SARS-CoV-2 that enhances infection.

Gain-of-function: The IC considers this as a research method that involves manipulating an organism's genetic material to impart new biological functions that could enhance virulence or transmissibility (e.g., genetically modifying a virus to expand its host range, transmissibility, or severity of illness). The IC assesses that genetic engineering, genetic modification, and laboratory-adaptation can all be used for gain-of-function experiments, but are not inherently so. We address both genetic engineering and laboratory-adaptation in the body of this assessment; the IC is unaware of an agreed, international definition.

Genetically engineered or genetically modified viruses are intentionally altered, created, or edited using biotechnologies, such as Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeat (CRISPR), DNA recombination, or reverse genetics. These viruses have intentional, targeted edits to the genome designed to achieve specific results, but unintentional genomic changes may also occur.

Genome: The genetic material of an organism. It consists of DNA (and sometimes RNA for viruses).

Genome sequencing: The process of determining the DNA or RNA sequence of an organism's genome, or its "genetic code." An organism's genetic code is the order in which the four nucleotide bases—adenine, cytosine, guanine, and thymine—are arranged to direct the sequence of the 20 different amino acids in the proteins that determine inherited traits.

Intermediate species/host: An organism that can be infected with a pathogen from a resevoir species and

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passes the pathogen to another host species; infection is not sustained in this population.

Laboratory-adapted viruses have undergone natural, random mutations through human-enabled processes in a laboratory—such as repeated passage through animals or cells—that put pressure on the virus to more rapidly evolve. Specific changes to the viral genome are not necessarily anticipated in these processes, though the virus can be expected to gain certain characteristics, like the ability to infect a new species. This is a common technique used in public health research of viruses. We consider directed evolution to be under laboratory adaptation.

Laboratory-associated incidents include incidents that happen in biological research facilities or during research-related sampling activities.

Molecular biology: Study of the molecular basis of activities in and between cells. This includes techniques to amplify or join genetic sequences.

Naturally occurring viruses have not been altered in a laboratory. Viruses commonly undergo random mutations as part of the evolutionary process and can continue to change over time; mutations may enable a virus to adapt to its environment, such as evading host immune responses and promoting viral replication.

Outbreak: A sudden increase in occurrences of a disease in a particular time and place. Outbreaks include **epidemics**, which is a term that is reserved for infectious diseases that occur in a confined geographical area. **Pandemics** are near-global disease outbreaks.

Pangolin: An African and Asian mammal that has a body covered in overlapping scales. Pangolins are a natural reservoir of coronaviruses and researchers are investigating their potential role as an intermediate host for SARS-CoV-2.

Pathogen: A bacterium, virus, or other microorganism that can cause disease.

Phylogenetics: The study of the evolutionary relationships among groups of organisms.

Progenitor virus: A virus that is closely related enough—probably more than 99 percent—to SARS-CoV-2 to have been its direct ancestor or plausible immediate origin of the outbreak. The closest known relative to SARS-CoV-2 is only around 96 percent similar; to put this into context, humans and chimps are around 99 percent similar, demonstrating the signficant differences even at this similarity.

RaTG13: A coronavirus with the closest known whole genome to SARS-CoV-2, although it is widely believed to not be a direct ancestor of SARS-CoV-2.

Resevoir species/host: An organism that harbors a pathogen, which is endemic within the population.

RNA (ribonucleic acid): A molecule essential for gene coding, decoding, regulation, and expression. Certain viruses use RNA as a genetic blueprint.

Transmissibility: The measure of new infections initiated by an existing infection.

Virus: A replicating piece of genetic material—DNA or RNA—and associated proteins that use the cellular machinery of a living cell to reproduce.

Wet market: A market where fresh food and live and dead animals, including wildlife, are sold.

Zoonosis: An infection or a disease that is transmissible from animals to humans under natural conditions. A **zoonotic pathogen** may be viral, bacterial, or parasitic, and can sometimes be transmitted through insects, such as mosquitoes.

Zoonotic spillover: An initial infection or disease that is caused by contact between an animal and human under natural conditions.

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Annex B: IC Examination of Open-Source Theories

IC analysts have examined a number of open-source articles from a variety of sources that have raised theories about SARS-CoV-2 and COVID-19's origin. The IC assesses that these theories generally do not provide diagnostic information on COVID-19 origins, and in some cases, are not supported by the information available to us. However, several have drawn on insightful methods or identified potential leads.

Theory of Abnormal Activity at the WIV in Fall 2019

The IC assesses that an assessment about abnormal activity at the WIV in fall 2019 lacks support and does not offer diagnostic insight. The Multi-Agency Collaboration Environment (MACE) published a report assessing that the pandemic began in October 2019 because of a release at the WIV.

- Although the methodology is insightful, the IC has concerns with the small data set and analytic rigor used to derive the group's findings, and our review of information directly contradicts some of its findings.

Theory That SARS-CoV-2 Was a Biological Weapon

The IC assesses that public claims from a Hong Kong virologist that Beijing created SARS-CoV-2 as a biological weapon are inconsistent with available technical information on coronaviruses. We assess that the articles contain several technical inaccuracies and omit key data points.

- Since September 2020, a virologist who worked in a WHO-affiliated laboratory in Hong Kong has publicly stated that Beijing created SARS-CoV-2 from bat coronaviruses and that China's researchers intentionally released it. The scientific community did not peer review these articles and some publicly rejected the articles' claims as scientifically unsound.

Theory That SARS-CoV-2 Was Genetically Engineered

The IC assesses that public claims that some distinguishing features in SARS-CoV-2 are the result of genetic engineering are not diagnostic of genetic engineering. The IC has been evaluating how SARS-CoV-2 could have developed these features and notes that the furin cleavage site (FCS)—a region in the spike protein that enables infection and has been the topic of open-source debate—can also be consistent with a natural origin of the virus.

We do not fully understand the diversity of natural coronaviruses or how often they recombine, suggesting that there are plausible natural means by which these features in SARS-CoV-2 could have emerged beyond what we currently understand.

- For example, the author of an article in April notes the SARS-CoV-2's FCS is unique among known betacoronaviruses. The author argues that such features are rare and so well-adapted for human infection that they are more likely emerged from laboratory work than from natural selection.

- Although an IC review of scientific literature has indicated that no known betacoronaviruses in the same subgenus have this FCS in the same region of the spike protein as SARS-CoV-2, similar FCSs are present in the same region of the spike protein as other naturally occurring coronaviruses, according to scientific articles.

We also do not find credible a now-withdrawn preprint article from two Indian educational institutes posted in January 2020 that asserted SARS-CoV-2 was genetically engineered using sequences from the human immunodeficiency virus. We assess it is unlikely that scientists would have chosen to intentionally engineer the specific sequences that were the focus of the scientific article.

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Theory That SARS-CoV-2 Originated Outside China

We are aware of scientific studies claiming to have found SARS-CoV-2 viral fragments or antibodies in samples taken before November 2019 outside China. However, technical flaws in some of these studies, uncertainties in the methodologies, and in some cases, the lack of a credible review process make us skeptical of their utility in determining the pandemic's origin.

- We assess that the first cluster of confirmed COVID-19 cases arose in Wuhan, China, in late 2019, but we lack insight—and may never have it—on where the first SARS-CoV-2 infection occurred. Although all of the earliest confirmed cases of COVID-19 were documented in China's Hubei Province, where Wuhan is located, according to Western and China's press reports, it is plausible that a traveler came in contact with the virus elsewhere and then went to Wuhan.

- We continue to monitor scientific publications and discuss these issues with experts. Even if the virus is found to have existed outside China before the Wuhan outbreak, credible evidence of human infection would also be necessary to determine if the first COVID-19 outbreak began there.

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Annex C: IC Approach to 90-Day Study

The NIC collaborated closely with the National Counterproliferation Center (NCPC), the National Intelligence Management Council (NIMC), IC agencies, and other USG entities and departments on this assessment. The IC kicked off the 90-day study by outlining the core intelligence questions that would be addressed over lines of effort—collection and analysis. These questions included:

- Did the outbreak begin through contact with infected domestic or wild animals or was it the result of a laboratory-associated incident?
- Was the virus genetically engineered?
- Is SARS-CoV-2 a biological weapon?

Collection: At the kick-off meeting for the 90-day study, the IC discussed core intelligence gaps to drive collection moving forward.

Analysis: The NIC had two separate structured analytic exercises to discuss both the underlying reporting and to strengthen argumentation moving into the drafting phase. Analysts at individual agencies also pursued various structured analytic techniques to build their own assessments.

- During a two-day-long in-person IC-wide **Analysis of Competing Hypothesis (ACH)** analytic exercise in June, analysts determined whether existing reporting was consistent or inconsistent with information in individual reports. This exercise allowed analysts to determine that most reporting was consistent with both hypotheses and the reporting that was inconsistent was deemed to be not credible.
- Before the start of drafting, the NIC hosted an IC-wide **Team A/Team B** analytic exercise to explore how the IC could strengthen either hypothesis through a debate style format. Agencies pulled from these conversations—along with the work conducted during and before the study—to solidify their consensus positions.

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Annex D: Outside Review

The NIC conducted four rounds of outside review of the draft assessment. These sessions provided valuable feedback that we incorporated into the assessment. The NIC made some organizational changes in response to comments; comments included:

- Emphasize points of agreement.
- Provide additional definitions in the lexicon and ensure technical or intelligence jargon is explicitly explained.

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Annex E: Questions

Answers to the following questions would help us better evaluate hypotheses related to the origins of COVID-19:

What additional information—to include timing, location, relevant animal exposures, occupational information, and clinical samples—is there on the earliest cases of COVID-19?

How were early cases investigated? What questions or tools were utilized for tracing contacts and contacts of those contacts?

What direct or indirect indicators of COVID-19 clusters is China aware of from early in the outbreak? This may include things like hospital occupancy rates or efforts to triage medical care outside of hospital facilities.

What insight can China provide on the search for the reservoir and potential intermediate species of the COVID-19 virus?

What insight can China provide on the search for the identification of a progenitor virus? Have any leading candidates or regions for spillover been identified?

What information, data, and/or samples does China have on wildlife or other animals present in the following markets in Wuhan:

- Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market
- Qiyimen Live Animal Market
- Baishazhou Market
- Dijiao Outdoor Pet Market

What information, data, and/or samples does China have on wildlife present in the other markets, wildlife rescue centers, and/or farms in Wuhan, across Hubei, in neighboring provinces, or in locations where live animals in Hubei Province are sourced from?

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ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-05-2025 BY [redacted] NSICG

FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10)

[redacted]

b3 -5
b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -1

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN//LES~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

Title: (U) Declassification Authority Request: Documentation of Verbal Declassification [redacted] [redacted]

Date: 03/27/2023

b7E -2

From: [redacted]

Contact: [redacted]

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -2,3

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

b3 -5
b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -1,4,6,8

Case ID #: [redacted] (U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted]

(U) **Synopsis:** (~~S~~//~~NF~~) [redacted] an Original Classification Authority (OCA), verbally authorized a partial declassification of information from [redacted] for verbal use of the attached and below-listed statements for [redacted]

b3 -5
b7E -1,2,4,8

~~Reason: 1.4(b)~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSICG~~
~~Declassify On: 50X1-HUM~~

Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the following items:

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN//LES~~

[redacted]

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN//LES~~

Title: (U) Declassification Authority Request: Documentation of Verbal Declassification [redacted] b3 -5 b7E -1,2,4

Re: [redacted] 03/27/2023

(U) 1. ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] - Document for partial Declassification - Statement as marked on digital copy [redacted]

Details:

(U) **Background**

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] [redacted] an Original Classification Authority (OCA), verbally authorized partial declassification of information from [redacted] for verbal use of the attached and below-listed information for [redacted] b3 -5 b7E -1,2,4,8

[redacted]

(U) **Predication**

(U) [redacted]

[redacted] b7E -4,5,8

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN//LES~~

24-cv-2684 (FBI)-20

b3 -5
b7E -1,2

Title: (U) Declassification Authority Request: Documentation of Verbal Declassification by [redacted]
Re: [redacted] 03/27/2023

(U) ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ [redacted]

[redacted]

b1 -per ODNI
b3 -5 per FBI, ODNI
b7E -1,2,4,5,6,8,14

(U) ~~(S)~~

[redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted]

[redacted]

b7E -4

[redacted] b3 -5 b7E -1

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN//LES~~

Title: (U) Declassification Authority Request: Documentation of Verbal Declassification by [redacted] b3 -5 b7E -1,2

Re: [redacted] 03/27/2023

[redacted] b7E -4

(U) **Declassification Authority Justification**

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] a Declassification Authority, provided declassification of one sentence contained within [redacted] for use in [redacted] b3 -5 b7E -1,2,4,8

(U) The sentence within [redacted] is marked and located on [redacted] b3 -5 b7E -1,4

TEARLINE

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] b7E -2,4,5,8

(U) The second statement [redacted] was spoken by FBI Director Christopher Wray on February 28, 2023 during a Fox News interview:

(U) "The FBI has long assessed the origin of the pandemic was likely a laboratory-associated incident in Wuhan."

END OF TEARLINE

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN//LES~~

Title: (U) Declassification Authority Request: Documentation of Verbal Declassification [redacted] b3 -5 b7E -1,2
Re: [redacted] 03/27/2023

(U) Protection of Classified Information

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] have reviewed the information to be declassified: b7E -2

(U) (S//~~NF~~) The declassification request [redacted] b7E -4,8

(U//~~FOUO~~) Per the FBI's Declassification of Classified National Security Information Guide, [redacted] has reviewed the applicable information to be declassified [redacted] b7E -2,4

1. (U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] b7E -4,8

2. (U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] b3 -5 b7E -4,8

3. (U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] b3 -5 b7E -4,8,14

Title: (U) Declassification Authority Request: Documentation of Verbal Declassification [redacted] b3 -5 b7E 1,2
Re: [redacted] 03/27/2023

4. (U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] b7E -4,8

5. (U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] b7E -4

6. (U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] b7E -4

(U) Based upon the above justification, [redacted] an OCA, is requested to formally approve declassification of the above outlined material for use by [redacted] b7E -2,4,8

(U) Records Management Division [redacted] is requested to concur with declassification of information contained in the proposed tearline. b7E -2

(U) The [redacted] is respectfully requested to cover the lead. b7E -2

(U) Any questions or concerns regarding the above request should be submitted to [redacted] b6 -1 b7C -1 b7E -2,3

♦♦

[redacted] **(FBI)**

From: [redacted] (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, May 25, 2021 4:40 PM
To: [redacted] (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (FBI); [redacted] (FBI); [redacted] (FBI); [redacted] (FBI)
Subject: RE: NYT Media Inquiry - COVID-19 --- UNCLASSIFIED

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -2,3

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
==========

b5 -1
b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -2,3

Good afternoon [redacted]

[redacted]

Thank you,

[redacted]

From: [redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, May 25, 2021 3:36 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted] (FBI) [redacted] (FBI) [redacted] (FBI) [redacted]
Subject: NYT Media Inquiry - COVID-19 --- UNCLASSIFIED
Importance: High

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -2,3

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
==========
TRANSITORY RECORD

b3 -5
b5 -1 per FBI, ODNI
b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -2,3,14

Good afternoon, [redacted] received an inquiry from the New York Times regarding the origins of the Coronavirus. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

b6 -1
b7C -1
b5 -1 per FBI, ODNI

[redacted]

[redacted]

Thanks in advance.

v/r,

[redacted]

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -3

FBIHQ, National Press Office

[redacted]

==========
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

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Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA)
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOIA Request No.: 1637738-000
Civil Action No.: 24-cv-2684

Total Withheld Page(s) = 73

Bates Page Reference	Reason for Withholding (i.e., exemptions with coded rationale, duplicate, sealed by order of court, etc.)
FBI(24-cv-2684)-29 - FBI(24-cv-2684)-30	(b)(5)-1; (b)(7)(E)-2,-4,-5,-8
FBI(24-cv-2684)-31	(b)(5)-1; (b)(7)(E)-4,-5,-8
FBI(24-cv-2684)-32 - FBI(24-cv-2684)-33	(b)(5)-1; (b)(6)-2; (b)(7)(C)-2; (b)(7)(E)-4,-5,-8
FBI(24-cv-2684)-34	(b)(5)-1; (b)(7)(E)-2,-4,-5,-8
FBI(24-cv-2684)-35 - FBI(24-cv-2684)-52	Duplicate
FBI(24-cv-2684)-54	(b)(5)-1; (b)(6)-1; (b)(7)(C)-1; (b)(7)(E)-4,-5,-8
FBI(24-cv-2684)-55-56	(b)(5)-1; (b)(7)(E)-4,-5,-8
FBI(24-cv-2684)-59	(b)(5)-1; (b)(6)-1; (b)(7)(C)-1; (b)(7)(E)-2,-4,-5,-8
FBI(24-cv-2684)-60	(b)(1)-1; (b)(3)-5; (b)(5)-1; (b)(7)(E)-4,-5,-8
FBI(24-cv-2684)-61	(b)(5)-1; (b)(7)(E)-4,-5,-8
FBI(24-cv-2684)-62	(b)(5)-1; (b)(7)(E)-2,-4,-5,-8
FBI(24-cv-2684)-63	(b)(5)-1; (b)(6)-1; (b)(7)(C)-1; (b)(7)(E)-2,-4,-5,-8
FBI(24-cv-2684)-64	(b)(1)-1; (b)(3)-5; (b)(5)-1; (b)(7)(E)-4,-5,-8
FBI(24-cv-2684)-65	(b)(5)-1; (b)(7)(E)-4,-5,-8
FBI(24-cv-2684)-66	(b)(5)-1; (b)(7)(E)-2,-4,-5,-8
FBI(24-cv-2684)-67 - FBI(24-cv-2684)-104	Referral/Consultation

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X Deleted Page(s) X
X No Duplication Fee X
X For this Page X
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From: [redacted](OGC) (FBI)
Subject: ODNI COVID-19
To: [redacted](DO) (DET)
Sent: February 27, 2023 3:36 PM (UTC-05:00)

b6 -1
b7C -1

Here's ODNI's unclassified report: https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/Declassified-Assessment-on-COVID-19-Origins.pdf

Relevant Highlights:

Updated Assessment on COVID-19 Origins
Key Takeaways

Scope Note: This assessment responds to the President's request that the Intelligence Community (IC) update its previous judgments
on the origins of COVID-19. It also identifies areas for possible additional research. Annexes include a lexicon, additional details on
methodology, and comments from outside experts. This assessment is based on information through August 2021.

The IC assesses that SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, probably emerged and infected humans through an initial small-scale exposure that occurred no later than November 2019 with the first known cluster of COVID-19 cases arising in Wuhan, China in December 2019. In addition, the IC was able to reach broad agreement on several other key issues. We judge the virus was not developed as a biological weapon. Most agencies also assess with low confidence that SARS-CoV-2 probably was not genetically engineered; however, two agencies believe there was not sufficient evidence to make an assessment either way. Finally, the IC assesses China's officials did not have foreknowledge of the virus before the initial outbreak of COVID-19 emerged.

After examining all available intelligence reporting and other information, though, the IC remains divided on the most likely origin of COVID-19. All agencies assess that two hypotheses are plausible: natural exposure to an infected animal and a laboratory-associated incident.

„h Four IC elements and the National Intelligence Council assess with low confidence that the initial SARS-CoV-2 infection was most likely caused by natural exposure to an animal infected with it or a close progenitor virus—a virus that probably would be more than 99 percent similar to SARS-CoV-2. These analysts give weight to China's officials' lack of foreknowledge, the numerous vectors for natural exposure, and other factors.

„h One IC element assesses with moderate confidence that the first human infection with SARS-CoV-2 most likely was the result of a laboratory-associated incident, probably involving experimentation, animal handling, or sampling by the Wuhan Institute of Virology. These analysts give weight to the inherently risky nature of work on coronaviruses.

„h Analysts at three IC elements remain unable to coalesce around either explanation without additional information, with some analysts favoring natural origin, others a laboratory origin, and some seeing the hypotheses as equally likely.

„h Variations in analytic views largely stem from differences in how agencies weigh intelligence reporting and scientific publications and intelligence and scientific gaps.

The IC judges they will be unable to provide a more definitive explanation for the origin of COVID-19 unless new information allows them to determine the specific pathway for initial natural contact with an animal or to determine that a laboratory in Wuhan was handling SARS-CoV-2 or a close progenitor virus before COVID-19 emerged.

„h The IC¡Xand the global scientific community¡Xlacks clinical samples or a complete understanding of epidemiological data from the earliest COVID-19 cases. If we obtain information on the earliest cases that

identified a location of interest or occupational exposure, it may alter our evaluation of hypotheses.

China's cooperation most likely would be needed to reach a conclusive assessment of the origins of COVID-19. Beijing, however, continues to hinder the global investigation, resist sharing information, and blame other countries, including the United States. These actions reflect, in part, China's government's own uncertainty about where an investigation could lead as well as its frustration the international community is using the issue to exert political pressure on China.

[redacted]

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Desk: [redacted]
Cell: [redacted]

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ON 03-26-2025

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b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -2,4,8

From: [redacted]
Subject: FW: --- ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~
To: [redacted]
Sent: July 19, 2023 10:15 AM (UTC-04:00)
Attached: [redacted]

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From: [redacted] (DO) (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, March 7, 2023 4:16 PM
To: [redacted] (OCA) (FBI) [redacted]
Cc: DUNHAM, CHRISTOPHER G. (DO) (FBI) [redacted] (CID) (FBI) [redacted] (DO) (FBI) [redacted] (DO) (DET) [redacted]
Subject: RE: ATA- Final COVID Paper--- ~~TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON/NOFORN~~ --- ~~TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON/NOFORN~~
Attachments: covid_Final + [redacted].docx

Categories: Green Category

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~~Classification: TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON/NOFORN~~

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My edits here thank you

From: [redacted] (OCA) (FBI) [redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, March 7, 2023 3:48 PM
To: [redacted] (DO) (FBI) [redacted]
Cc: DUNHAM, CHRISTOPHER G. (DO) (FBI) [redacted] (CID) (FBI) [redacted]
Subject: ATA- Final COVID Paper--- ~~TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON/NOFORN~~ --- ~~TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON/NOFORN~~

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<< File: covid_Final.docx >>
Sir,

Please see the attached paper on COVID for ATAs.

[redacted]
Legislative Affairs Specialist
Office of Congressional Affairs

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FOI/PA# 24-cv-2684

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Page 14 ~ b1 - 1; b3 - 5; b7D - 5; b7E - 1,3,4,5,8;
Page 16 ~ b3 - 3; b7D - 5; b7E - 1,3,4,5,8;
Page 18 ~ b3 - 5; b7E - 1,2,3,4,5,8;
Page 21 ~ b3 - 5; b5 - 1; b7E - 1,3,4,5,8;
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Page 29 ~ b3 - 5; b7E - 1,3,4,5,8;
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Page 32 ~ b3 - 5; b7E - 1,3,4,5,8;
Page 33 ~ b3 - 5; b7E - 1,3,4,5,8;
Page 34 ~ b3 - 5; b7E - 1,3,4;
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Page 41 ~ b7D - 5; b7E - 4,5,8;
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Page 53 ~ b3 - 5; b7E - 4,5,8;
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[redacted]

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(U) PREPARED BY [redacted]

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b3 -5 per FBI, DOD
b7E -2,4,5,8 per FBI

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a (U)
b (U) Analyst Note:

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d (U//~~FOUO~~)

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[redacted]

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(U) ~~(S//INF)~~ [redacted]

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b7E -1,4,5,8

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

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

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[redacted]

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(U) Endnotes

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[redacted]

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(U) 2 ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [redacted]

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[redacted]

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(U) 3 ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [redacted]

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[redacted]

3. ☆



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(U) ~~*(S//REL TO USA,FVEY)~~

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Lead Report

Precedence: Routine **Date:** 08/10/2023
Lead Type: Action
Deadline: 05/26/2023
Lead Number: 16

From: [redacted]
Contact: [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

b6 -1
b7C -1
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Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: [redacted] (U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted]

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Reference: [redacted]

Details: (U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] respectfully requests declassification action by [redacted] for the referenced statements.

Re: [redacted]

Lead: 16, 08/10/2023

Location

To:

Recipient:

Assignee:

Attn:

Status: Covered

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Coverages:

03/31/2023 by [redacted]

Reference: [redacted]

(U) [redacted] concurs with declassification of the tearline sentence.

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ON 06-20-2024

FD-1036 (Rev. 10-16-2009)

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b7E -1,4,5,8

Form Type:

Date: 09/29/2021

(U) Title: (~~S//OC,USGOV/NF//LES~~)

Approved By:

Drafted By:

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b7E -1,2,4,5,8

Case ID #:

(U) Synopsis: (~~S//OC,USGOV/NF//LES~~)

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[a] (U)
[b] (U) *Analyst Note:*

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b7E -4,5,8

[c] (U)
[d] (U) ~~FOUO~~

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FOIA Request No.: 1637738-000
Civil Action No.: 24-cv-2684

Total Withheld Page(s) = 18

Bates Page Reference	Reason for Withholding (i.e., exemptions with coded rationale, duplicate, sealed by order of court, etc.)
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FBI(24-cv-2684)-68	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, (b)(1) per ODNI, (b)(1) per DIA, (b)(1) per NGA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, (b)(3) per ODNI, (b)(3) per DIA; (b)(7)(E)-4,-5,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-69	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, (b)(1) per ODNI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, (b)(3) per ODNI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-5,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-70	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, (b)(1) per ODNI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, (b)(3) per ODNI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-5,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-71	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, (b)(1) per ODNI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, (b)(3) per ODNI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-5,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-72	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, (b)(1) per ODNI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, (b)(3) per ODNI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-5,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-73	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, (b)(1) per ODNI, (b)(1) per NGA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, (b)(3) per ODNI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-82	(b)(1)-1 per FBI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI; (b)(6)-4 per FBI; (b)(7)(C)-4 per FBI; (b)(7)(D)-5 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-5,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-83	(b)(1)-1 per FBI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI; (b)(6)-4 per FBI; (b)(7)(C)-4 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-5,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-85	(b)(1)-1 per FBI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI; (b)(7)(D)-5 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-5,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-86	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, (b)(1) per DIA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI; (b)(7)(D)-5 per FBI, (b)(7)(D) per DIA; (b)(7)(E)-4,-5,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-89	(b)(1)-1 per FBI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-5,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-90	(b)(1)-1 per FBI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI; (b)(7)(D)-5 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-5,-8 per FBI

FBI(24-cv-2684)-91	(b)(1)-1 per FBI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-5,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-101	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, (b)(1) per DIA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, (b)(3) per DIA; (b)(6)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(C)-1 per FBI;(b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-102 - FBI(24-cv-2684)-103	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, (b)(1) per DIA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, (b)(3) per DIA; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-104	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, (b)(1) per DIA, (b)(1) per ODNI, (b)(1) per NGA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, (b)(3) per DIA, (b)(3) per ODNI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-5,-8 per FBI

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EXCEPT WHERE OTHERWISE SHOWN
DATE 5/26/2023
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG
REASON: 1.4(C)

23 August 2021

b1-1
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b7C-1
b7E-4,5,8

(U) (TS/

(U) (TS/)

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

Research

Geographic Presence of Coronaviruses

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) (TS/)

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b3-5
b7D-5
b7E-4,5,8

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b7D-5
b7E-2,4,5,8

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[a] (U)

b1-1
b3-5
b6-1
b7C-1
b7E-4,5,8

(U) (S)

~~CLASSIFIED BY: | DERIVED FROM: Multiple Sources | DECLASSIFY ON: 50X1-HUM~~

22 August 2021

b1-1 per DIA,ODNI,NGA,FBI
b3-5 per DIA,ODNI,FBI
b7E-4,5,8 per FBI

(U//~~FOUO~~) Key Evidence

(U) ~~TS~~//

ORIGIN THEORY

(U) ~~TS~~//

Evidence #1

(U) ~~TS~~//

Evidence #2

(U) ~~TS~~//

Evidence #3

(U) ~~TS~~//

Evidence #4

(U) ~~TS~~//REL TO USA, FVEY)

Evidence #5

(U) ~~TS~~//

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

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b1-1
b3-5
b6-1
b7C-1
b7E-4,5,8

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~~Classified By: [redacted] | Derived From: Multiple Sources | Declassify On: 50X1-HUM~~

24-cv-2684 (FBI)-75

b1-1
b3-5
b6-1
b7C-1
b7E-2,4,5,8

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] b7E-4,5,8

[redacted]

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ The FBI concurs with the USIC and assesses the COVID-19 pandemic very likely originated in Wuhan, China. [redacted] b7E-4,5,8

[redacted]

[redacted] b7E-4,5,8

[redacted] b7E-4,5,8

(U) [redacted] b6-1 b7C-1 b7E-2,4,8

(U//~~FOUO~~) COVID-19 Origins Timeline

(U) (~~X~~//~~NF~~) Since January 2020, the FBI [redacted] has led the FBI's efforts to discern the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic. The [redacted], in coordination with FBI Field Offices, established and leveraged [redacted] new liaison relationships with subject matter experts (SME) in the scientific, public health, and biosecurity communities. Additionally, the [redacted] collaboration with FBI Field Offices led to the recruitment of [redacted] key confidential human sources [redacted] Further, the [redacted] collaborated with USIC and FVEY partners throughout 2020 and 2021, incorporating a variety of technical discussions and intelligence into the FBI's COVID-19 origins assessment. The [redacted] leveraged the [redacted] and its own scientific expertise to conduct a rigorous review of the available academic scientific literature on coronaviruses and to participate in interviews with SME liaisons, which informed the FBI's [redacted] efforts and overall origins assessment. The timeline below is an overview of the FBI's investigative and intelligence effort to discern the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic.

b7D-5
b7E-4,5,8

[redacted] COVID-19 Origins-related Interviews Captured in [redacted] Type 5 Assessment
[redacted] Subject Matter Expert Liaison Relationships Established
[redacted] Confidential Human Source Recruitments
[redacted] Senior-level USIC Products Written Regarding COVID-19 Origins
(U) [redacted]
(U) [redacted]
(U) [redacted]

(U) ~~(X)~~ [redacted] b1-1 b3-5 b6-1 b7C-1 b7E-4,8

FBI COVID-19 Investigative and Intelligence Activities – Latest Copy as of 1 June 2021

DATE 3/26/2025
FBI INFO. CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG/ [redacted]
REASON: 1.4(C)
DECLASSIFY ON 12/25/2050

(U) Key Findings

(U)

~~(X)~~/~~(NF)~~ Since March 2020, the FBI [redacted] has led the FBI's Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) investigative and intelligence activities to discern the origin of the COVID-19 pandemic [redacted] b1-1 b3-5 b7D-5 b7E-2,4,5,8 [redacted]. Key findings and a summary of efforts include:

(U)
- ~~(X)~~/ [redacted] b1-1 b3-5 b7E-4,5,8

(U)
- ~~(X)~~/ [redacted] b1-1 b3-5 b7E-4,5,8

(U)
- ~~(X)~~/ [redacted] b1-1 b3-5 b7E-4,5,8

- (U)~~(S//NF)~~ **From March 2020 to March 2021, the FBI conducted [redacted] interviews of US-based coronavirus subject matter experts, US-based scientists [d], and [redacted].** b7E-4,5,8

- (U)~~(S//NF)~~ **The FBI leveraged [redacted] new liaison relationships with scientific experts and recruited [redacted] confidential human source** [redacted] b7D-5 b7E-4,5,8

(U) Introduction

(U)~~(X)~~/~~(NF)~~ Over the past year under the FBI [redacted] Type 3 assessment, the [redacted] collected information on a myriad of national security threats related to COVID-19. As part of this Type 3 assessment, the FBI [redacted] b7E-2,4,5,8

(U)
~~(X)~~/ [redacted] b1-1 b3-5 b7E-4,5,8

[a] (U) [redacted]
[b] (U) [redacted]
(U) [c] ~~(X)~~ [redacted]
(U) [d] ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] b1-1 b3-5 b7E-4,5,8

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,8

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U)

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U)(S//NF) In an effort to effectively consider the various possibilities related to the origin of COVID-19,

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U)(S//NF) At the onset of the pandemic, the began to identify individuals who may have information on the possible origin of the COVID-19 pandemic. The

As a result, the , in coordination with field office Coordinators , interviewed , and US-based coronavirus experts across field offices to enhance the FBI's understanding of coronaviruses and COVID-19's possible origin. Throughout 2020 and early 2021, leading US researchers, key scientific liaison contacts, and CHS were re-interviewed to further refine the FBI's understanding of the pandemic's possible origin . Additionally, the leveraged interagency liaison relationships with the Department of Health and Human Services and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to gather information about coronavirus research funding, the earliest US-based cases of COVID-19, and earlier COVID-19 samples from countries bordering China. The also leveraged its historical and ongoing participation in the ODNI-sponsored which utilizes cleared subject matter experts (SMEs) to inform the USIC's understanding of COVID-19.

b1-1 per ODNI
b3-5 per ODNI
b7D-5 per FBI
b7E-2,4,5,8 per FBI

(U)(S//NF) From March 2020 to March 2021, the FBI conducted interviews, including US-based coronavirus subject matter experts—to include a , US-based scientists, . As of 25 March 2021, across the enterprise, the FBI produced or collected intelligence products on national security threats associated with COVID-19. Additionally, the FBI leveraged new liaison relationships with scientific experts and recruited CHS Further, the FBI leveraged partnerships within the USIC to access timely and reliable intelligence on COVID-19 by participating in routine ODNI-led synchronization conference calls with USIC partners to include, and the Department of State (DoS). Additionally, the FBI continually participated in numerous USIC and interagency discussions related to determining the COVID-19 origins, including partnerships with: ODNI (National Intelligence Officers

b1-1 per ODNI
b3-5 per ODNI,DIA
b7D-5 per FBI
b7E-2,4,5,8 per FBI

(U)

[c] (S//

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

[redacted] Department of State; and the CDC.

b1-1 per ODNI,FBI
b3-5 per ODNI,DIA,FBI
b7E-4,8

(U//~~FOUO~~) Background on Type 3 Assessment

(U)

(U//~~NF~~) [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U)(U//~~NF~~) Regarding origins [redacted], the [redacted] leveraged [redacted] field offices for access to coronavirus experts and other scientific experts within their AOR. The [redacted] leveraged a [redacted] with a PhD in [redacted] to conduct interviews of SMEs across multiple field offices, ensuring that complex scientific knowledge could be interpreted and recorded accurately. Additionally, the [redacted] provided [redacted] with bioinformatic analyses of genetic sequences provided by USIC partners, data existing in the public domain, and analysis of coronavirus cultures deposited in biological resource collections. The [redacted] senior microbiologist was temporarily assigned to the [redacted] to provide additional subject matter expertise support. These resources, in collaboration with the intelligence and scientific resources the [redacted] maintained within the division, provided invaluable insight on scientific and emerging threat information.

b6-1
b7C-1
b7E-2,4,5,8

(U)

(U//~~OC/NF~~) [redacted].

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-2,4,5,8

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,8

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,8

TOP SECRET//[redacted]
FBI INTERNAL USE ONLY – DO NOT DISSEMINATE EXTERNALLY

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,8

(U) Source Summary Statement

(U) [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U//~~FOUO~~) Origin of the COVID-19 Pandemic

(U) [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

[1] (U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

FBI INTERNAL USE ONLY – DO NOT DISSEMINATE EXTERNALLY
TOP SECRET//[redacted]

[redacted] b1-1 b3-5 b7E-4,8

(U) [redacted] b1-1 b3-5 b7E-4,5,8

- ~~(S//~~ [redacted] b1-1 b3-5 b7D-5 b7E-4,5,8 [55]

(U)

- ~~(S//~~ [redacted] b1-1 b3-5 b7E-4,5,8

(U//~~FOUO~~) Alternative Analysis: [redacted] b7E-4,5,8

(U)(~~S~~//~~NF~~) [redacted] b7E-4,5,8

(U)

- ~~(S~~//~~NF~~) [redacted] [58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67] b1-1 b3-5 b7E-4,5,8

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,8

(U)

- (U//~~OC-USGOV/NF~~)

b1-1
b3-5
b7D-5
b7E-4,5,8

[92] A November 2020 Italian serological study claimed there was evidence of SARS-CoV-2 circulating in Italy pre-global pandemic; this was published in an obscure Italian medical journal and the research institute was the recipient of Chinese funding, per the DoS.[93] [94]

[95]

(U)

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[96], [97]

[98]

[99]

[100]

b1-1
b3-5
b7D-5
b7E-4,5,8

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[102]

[103]

b1-1
b3-5
b7D-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) Outlook

(U) (U//~~NF~~)

b7E-4,5,8

(U)

(U//

b1-1 per DIA/FBI
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

[p] (U//~~FOUO~~)

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

b1-1 per DIA,ODNI, FBI
b3-5 per ODNI,FBI
b7E-4,5,8

participate in [redacted] meetings hosted by the ODNI, which utilizes cleared SMEs [redacted] that could help inform the USIC's understanding of COVID-19 origins. [redacted]

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] b7E-2,4,5,8 The [redacted] will work with FBI Field Offices to release Intelligence Information Reports containing intelligence collected from FBI interviews and continue to serve as one of the main interagency points of contact for USIC COVID-19 assessments and reporting.

b7E-2,4,8

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ The FBI [redacted] will continue to pursue and collect additional information related to COVID-19 origins. The FBI serves a unique role within the USIC, leveraging confidential human source and liaison relationships with [redacted] US-based subject matter experts. The intelligence and investigative practices and techniques used to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic will be applicable to future suspicious infectious disease outbreaks of concern, ensuring the FBI enhances its strategic threat planning capabilities to provide critical information to decision-makers in a timely manner.

(U) Endnotes

(U) 1 (U//

(U) 2 (S//NF) FBI | | (S//NF)

(U) 3 (U//

(U) 4 (U//

(U) 5 (U//FOUO)

(U) 6 (U//FOUO)

(U) 7

(U) 8 (U//NF)

(U) 9 (U//

(U) 10 (U//

(U) 11 (U//

(U) 12 (U//

13 (U)

14 (U)

(U) 15 (U//FOUO)

(U) 16 (U//

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8
b7D-5

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,8

[17] (U//~~FOUO~~) FBI | Case Information | [redacted] | "[TITLE REDACTED]" | UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ | UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~. b7E-4,5,8

[18] (U//~~FOUO~~) FBI | Case Information | [redacted] | "[TITLE REDACTED]" | UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ | UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~. b7E-4,5,8

[19] (U) [redacted] b7E-4,5,8

[20] (U//~~FOUO~~) FBI | Case Information | [redacted] | "[TITLE REDACTED]" | UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ | UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~. b7E-4,5,8

[21] (U//~~FOUO~~) FBI | Case Information | [redacted] | "[TITLE REDACTED]" | UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ | UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~. b7E-4,5,8

[22] (U//~~FOUO~~) FBI | Case Information | [redacted] | "[TITLE REDACTED]" | | UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ | UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~. b7E-4,5,8

(U) [23] ~~SC~~ [redacted] b1-1 b3-5 b7E-4,5,8

[24] (U) [redacted] b7E-4,5,8

[25] (U//~~FOUO~~) FBI | Case Information | [redacted] | "[TITLE REDACTED]" | UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ | UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~. b7E-4,5,8

[26] (U//~~FOUO~~) FBI | Case Information | [redacted] | "[TITLE REDACTED]" | UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ | UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~. b7E-4,5,8

(U) [27] ~~SC~~ [redacted] b1-1 b3-5 b7E-4,5,8

(U) [28] ~~SC~~ [redacted] b1-1 b3-5 b7E-4,5,8

(U) [29] ~~SC~~ [redacted] b1-1 b3-5 b7E-4,5,8

(U) [30] ~~SC~~ [redacted] b1-1 b3-5 b7E-4,5,8

[31] (U) [redacted] b7E-4,5,8

[32] (U) [redacted] b7E-4,5,8

[33] (U) [redacted] b7E-4,5,8

[34] (U) [redacted] b7E-4,5,8

[35] (U) [redacted] b7E-4,5,8

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,8

[36] (U) [redacted] b7E-4,5,8

[37] (U) [redacted] b7E-4,5,8

[38] (U) [redacted] b7E-4,5,8

[39] (U) [redacted] b7E-4,5,8

[40] (U) [redacted] b7E-4,5,8

[41] (U) FBI | Case Information | [redacted] | "[TITLE REDACTED]" | UNCLASSIFIED | UNCLASSIFIED. b7E-4,5,8

[42] (U//~~FOUO~~) FBI | Case Information | [redacted] | "[TITLE REDACTED]" | UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ | UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.~~ b7E-4,5,8

[43] (U//~~FOUO~~) FBI | Case Information | [redacted] | "[TITLE REDACTED]" | UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ | UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.~~ b7E-4,5,8

[44] (U) [redacted] b7E-4,5,8

[45] (U) [redacted] b7E-4,5,8

[46] (U//~~FOUO~~) FBI | Case Information | [redacted] | "[TITLE REDACTED]" | UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ | UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.~~ b7E-4,5,8

[47] (U//~~FOUO~~) FBI | Case Information | [redacted] | "[TITLE REDACTED]" | UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ | UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.~~ b7E-4,5,8

[48] (U) [redacted] b7E-4,5,8

[49] (U) [redacted] b7E-4,5,8

(U) [50] ~~(S//~~ [redacted] b1-1 b3-5

(U) [51] ~~(S//~~ [redacted] b7E-4,5,8

(U) [52] ~~(S//~~ [redacted] b1-1 b3-5 b7E-4,5,8

(U) [53] ~~(S//~~ [redacted] b1-1 b3-5

(U) [54] ~~(S//~~ [redacted] b7E-4,5,8

[55] (U//~~FOUO~~) FBI | Case Information | [redacted] | "[TITLE REDACTED]" | UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ | ~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN.~~ b7E-4,5,8

(U) [56] ~~(S//~~ [redacted] b1-1 b3-5 b7E-4,5,8

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,8

(U) [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

[57] ~~(S//~~ [redacted]

[58] (U//~~FOUO~~) FBI | Case Information | [redacted] | "[TITLE REDACTED]" | UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ | UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~. b7E-4,5,8

(U) [59] ~~(S//NF)~~ FBI | Case Information | [redacted] | "[TITLE REDACTED]" | ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ | ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~. b7E-4,5,8

(U) [60] ~~(S//NF)~~ FBI | Case Information | [redacted] | "[TITLE REDACTED]" | ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ | ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~. b7E-4,5,8

[61] (U//~~FOUO~~) FBI | Case Information | [redacted] | "[TITLE REDACTED]" | UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ | UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~. b7E-4,5,8

[62] (U//~~FOUO~~) FBI | Case Information | [redacted] | "[TITLE REDACTED]" | UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ | UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~. b7E-4,5,8

[63] (U//~~FOUO~~) FBI | Case Information | [redacted] | "[TITLE REDACTED]" | UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ | UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~. b7E-4,5,8

[64] (U//~~FOUO~~) FBI | Case Information | [redacted] | "[TITLE REDACTED]" | UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ | UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~. b7E-4,5,8

[65] (U//~~FOUO~~) FBI | Case Information | [redacted] | "[TITLE REDACTED]" | UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ | UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~. b7E-4,5,8

[66] (U//~~FOUO~~) FBI | Case Information | [redacted] | "[TITLE REDACTED]" | UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ | UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~. b7E-4,5,8

[67] (U//~~FOUO~~) FBI | Case Information | [redacted] | "[TITLE REDACTED]" | UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ | UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~. b7E-4,5,8

[68] (U//~~FOUO~~) FBI | Case Information | [redacted] | "[TITLE REDACTED]" | UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ | UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~. b7E-4,5,8

[69] (U//~~FOUO~~) FBI | Case Information | [redacted] | "[TITLE REDACTED]" | UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ | UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~. b7E-4,5,8

(U) [70] ~~(S//NF)~~ FBI | Case Information | [redacted] | "[TITLE REDACTED]" | ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ | ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~. b7E-4,5,8

(U) [71] ~~(S//~~ [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

[72] (U) [redacted] b7E-4,5,8

[73] (U) [redacted] b7E-4,5,8

[74] (U) [redacted] b7E-4,5,8

[75] (U) [redacted] b7E-4,5,8

[76] (U) [redacted] b7E-4,5,8

(U) [77] ~~(S//NF)~~ FBI | Case Information | [redacted] | "[TITLE REDACTED]" | ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ | ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~. b7E-4,5,8

(U) [78] ~~(S//NF)~~ FBI | Case Information | [redacted] | "[TITLE REDACTED]" | ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ | ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~. b7E-4,5,8

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,8

(U) [79] (S//NF) FBI | Case Information | [redacted] | "[TITLE REDACTED]" | SECRET//NOFORN | SECRET//NOFORN. b7E-4,5,8

(U) [80] (S//NF) FBI | Case Information | [redacted] | "[TITLE REDACTED]" | SECRET//NOFORN | SECRET//NOFORN. b7E-4,5,8

(U) [81] (S//NF) FBI | Case Information | [redacted] | "[TITLE REDACTED]" | SECRET//NOFORN | SECRET//NOFORN. b7E-4,5,8

(U) [82] [redacted]

(U) [83] [redacted] b1-1 b3-5

(U) [84] (S//NF) FBI | [redacted] | March 2020 (sic) "(S//NF) [redacted] | SECRET//NOFORN | SECRET//NOFORN. b7E-4,5,8

[85] (U//FOUO) FBI | Case Information | [redacted] | "[TITLE REDACTED]" | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | SECRET//NOFORN. b7E-4,5,8

[86] U(//FOUO) FBI | Case Information | [redacted] | "[TITLE REDACTED]" | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | SECRET//NOFORN. b7E-4,5,8

[87] U//FOUO) FBI | Case Information | [redacted] | "[TITLE REDACTED]" | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | SECRET//NOFORN. b7E-4,5,8

[88] (U) [redacted] b7E-4,5,8

(U) [redacted] b1-1 per DIA b7D-5 per DIA

(U) [90] (S//NF) [redacted] b1-1 b3-5 b7E-4,5,8

(U) [91] [redacted]

[92] (U) FBI | Case Information | [redacted] | "[TITLE REDACTED]" | UNCLASSIFIED | UNCLASSIFIED. b7E-4,5,8

[93] (U//SBU) US Department of State | Cable | 20 Milan 218 | 23 November 2020 | 6 November 2020 | "(U//SBU) Italy: Study Showing Early Antibodies in Italy Possible Chinese Disinformation" | UNCLASSIFIED//SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED | UNCLASSIFIED//SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED.

[94] (U) [redacted] b7E-4,5,8

[95] (U) [redacted] b7E-4,5,8

[96] (U) [redacted] b7E-4,5,8

[97] (U) [redacted] b7E-4,5,8

[98] (U) [redacted] b7E-4,5,8

[99] (U) [redacted] b7E-4,5,8

(U) [100] (S//NF) FBI | Case Information | [redacted] | "[TITLE REDACTED]" | SECRET//NOFORN | SECRET//NOFORN. b7E-4,5,8

(U) 101 ~~(S//~~ [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) 102 (~~S//NF~~) FBI | Case Information | [redacted] | "[TITLE REDACTED]" | ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ | ~~SECRET//NOFORN.~~ b7E-4,5,8

103 (U//~~FOUO~~) FBI | Case Information | [redacted] | "[TITLE REDACTED]" | UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ | ~~SECRET//NOFORN.~~ b7E-4,5,8

(U) 104 ~~(S//~~ [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) 105 ~~(S//~~ [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) 106 ~~(S//~~ [redacted]

107 (U) [redacted] b7E-4,5,8

108 (U) [redacted] b7E-4,5,8

109 (U) [redacted] b7E-4,5,8

110 (U) [redacted] b7E-4,5,8

111 (U//~~FOUO~~) FBI | Case Information | [redacted] | "[TITLE REDACTED]" | UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ | ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ b7E-4,5,8

112 (U) [redacted] b7E-4,5,8

(U) 113 ~~(S//~~ [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

114 (U) [redacted] b7E-4,5,8

115 (U) [redacted] b7E-4,5,8

116 (U) [redacted] b7E-4,5,8

117 (U) [redacted] b7E-4,5,8

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,8

118 (U) [redacted] b7E-4,5,8

119 (U) [redacted] b7E-4,5,8

120 (U) [redacted] b7E-4,5,8

121 (U) [redacted] b7E-4,5,8

122 (U) [redacted] b7E-4,5,8

(U) 123 [redacted] b1-1 b3-5 b7E-4,5,8

124 (U) [redacted] b7E-4,5,8

(U) 125 [redacted] b1-1 b3-5 b7E-4,5,8

126 (U) [redacted] b7E-4,5,8

127 (U) [redacted] b7E-4,5,8

(U) 128 [redacted] b1-1 b3-5 b7E-4,5,8

129 (U) [redacted] b7E-4,5,8

130 (U) [redacted] b7E-4,5,8

131 (U) [redacted] b7E-4,5,8

(U) 132 [redacted] b1-1 b3-5 b7E-4,5,8

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,8

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,8

[133] (U) [redacted] b7E-4,5,8

(U) [134] ~~(S//~~ [redacted] b1-1 b3-5 b7E-4,5,8

(U) [135] ~~(S//~~ [redacted] b1-1 b3-5 b7E-4,5,8

(U) [136] ~~(S//~~ [redacted] b1-1 b3-5 b7E-4,5,8

[137] (U) [redacted] b7E-4,5,8

(U) [138] ~~(S//~~ [redacted] b1-1 b3-5 b7E-4,5,8

[139] (U) [redacted] b7E-4,5,8

[140] (U) [redacted] b7E-4,5,8

[141] (U//~~FOUO~~) FBI | Case Information | [redacted] | "[TITLE REDACTED]" | UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ | UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~. b7E-4,5,8

(U) [142] ~~(S//~~ [redacted] b1-1 b3-5 b7E-4,5,8

[143] (U) [redacted] b7E-4,5,8

[144] (U) [redacted] b7E-4,5,8

(U) [145] ~~(S//~~ [redacted] b1-1 b3-5 b7E-4,5,8

(U) [146] ~~(S//~~ [redacted]

(U) [147] ~~(S//~~ [redacted] b1-1 b3-5 b7E-4,5,8

DECLASSIFIED BY [redacted] /NSICG
on 15 March 2021

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ Overview of 2020-2021 [redacted] and Investigative Efforts to Assess COVID-19 Origin [redacted]

b3-5
b6-1
b7C-1
b7E-2,4,5,8

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ Since January 2020, the FBI [redacted] has led the FBI's efforts to address the variety of national security threats posed by the COVID-19 outbreak. The FBI established and leveraged new liaison relationships with scientific subject matter experts (SMEs)—including US-based coronavirus SMEs, US-based scientists, and [redacted] recruited [redacted] confidential human source [redacted] also worked collaboratively within the FBI and across the USIC, incorporating a myriad of technical and academic intelligence while sharing unique [redacted] collection. This graphic highlights FBI efforts that were critical in enhancing the FBI's understanding of COVID-19 origins [redacted].

b3-5
b7D-5
b7E-2,4,5,8


(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ COVID-19 Interviews
[redacted] Total COVID-19 origins-related interviews captured in the [redacted] Type 3 Assessment
[redacted] New SME liaison relationships initiated
[redacted] CHS Recruitment [redacted]
(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ Internal Collaboration
[redacted] FBI Field Offices collaborated with [redacted] to collect and analyze COVID-19 origins [redacted] related intelligence
[redacted] FBIHQ Operational Divisions contributed information to the [redacted] Type 3 Assessment
[redacted] Coordinator with a background in [redacted] who conducted scientifically complex COVID-19-related interviews
(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ External Collaboration
[redacted] USIC Agencies with whom [redacted] maintained close collaboration regarding COVID-19 Origins [redacted] ODNI)
[redacted] Senior-level USIC products on COVID-19 origins with [redacted] contributions
[redacted] Routine USIC engagements on COVID-19, regularly attended by the [redacted] and USIC COVID-19 Sync)

b1-1
b3-5 per DIA,FBI
b7E-2,4,5,8

b3-5
b7E-2,4,5,8

b1-1 per ODNI,FBI
b3-5 per ODNI,FBI
b6-1
b7C-1
b7D-5
b7E-2,4,5,8

(U) [redacted]

b3-5
b6-1
b7C-1
b7E-2,4,5,8

~~CLASSIFIED BY: [redacted] | DERIVED FROM: FBI NSICG dated 20171025 | DECLASSIFY ON: 50X1-HUM~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA)
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOIA Request No.:1637738-000
Civil Action No.: 24-cv-2684
Total Withheld Page(s) = 170

Bates Page Reference	Reason for Withholding (i.e., exemptions with coded rationale, duplicate, sealed by order of court, etc.)
FBI(24-cv-2684)-153	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(6)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(C)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-154	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-155	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI, per DOS, per NGA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-156 - FBI(24-cv-2684)-158	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-159	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI, per NGA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-160	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-161 - FBI(24-cv-2684)-162	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI, per NGA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-163	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI, per DOS, per NGA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI, per DIA; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-164 - FBI(24-cv-2684)-165	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI, per NGA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-166 - FBI(24-cv-2684)-168	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-169 - FBI(24-cv-2684)-170	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI, per NGA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-171	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-172	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI, per DOS, per DIA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI, per DIA; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-173	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI, per NGA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-174	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI, per DOS; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(5) per DOS; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-175 - FBI(24-cv-2684)-179	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI

FBI(24-cv-2684)-180	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI, per NGA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-181	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-182	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI, per DIA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI, per DIA; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-183	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI, per NGA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-184 - FBI(24-cv-2684)-186	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-188	(b)(1) per ODNI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(5)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-2,-3,-4,-5,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-189	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(5)-1 per FBI;(b)(6)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(C)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-190	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(5)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-191	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI, per DOS, per NGA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(5)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-192 - FBI(24-cv-2684)-194	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(5)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-195	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI, per NGA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(5)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-196	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(5)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-197 - FBI(24-cv-2684)-198	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI, per NGA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(5)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-199	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI, per DOS, per NGA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(5)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-200 - FBI(24-cv-2684)-201	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI, per NGA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(5)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-202 - FBI(24-cv-2684)-204	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(5)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-205 - FBI(24-cv-2684)-206	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI, per NGA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(5)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-207	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(5)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-208	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI, per DOS, per DIA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI, per DIA; (b)(5)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI

FBI(24-cv-2684)-209	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI, per NGA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(5)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-210	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI, per DOS; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(5)-1 per FBI, per DOS; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-211 - FBI(24-cv-2684)-215	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(5)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-216	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI, per NGA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(5)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-217	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(5)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-218	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI, per DIA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI, per DIA; (b)(5)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-219	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI, per NGA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(5)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-220 - FBI(24-cv-2684)-227	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(5)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-228 - FBI(24-cv-2684)-229	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI, per DIA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI, per DIA; (b)(5)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-230 - FBI(24-cv-2684)-257	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(5)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-258	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI, per DIA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI, per DIA; (b)(5)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-259	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI, per NGA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(5)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-260 - FBI(24-cv-2684)-262	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(5)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-263	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per ODNI, per NGA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per ODNI; (b)(5)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-277 - FBI(24-cv-2684)-278	(b)(1)-1 per FBI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI; (b)(5)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-279	(b)(1)-1 per FBI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI; (b)(5)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-5,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-280 - FBI(24-cv-2684)-281	(b)(1)-1 per FBI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI; (b)(5)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-285	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per WHCO; (b)(3)-5 per FBI; (b)(5) per WHCO; (b)(6)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(C)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI

FBI(24-cv-2684)-286	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per WHCO, per NGA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI; (b)(5) per WHCO; (b)(7)(E)-4,-5,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-287	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per WHCO, per DIA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per DIA; (b)(5) per WHCO; (b)(7)(D)-5 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-5,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-288	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per WHCO; (b)(3)-5 per FBI; (b)(5) per WHCO; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-289	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per WHCO; (b)(3)-5 per FBI; (b)(5) per WHCO; (b)(7)(E)-4,-5,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-290 - FBI(24-cv-2684)-291	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per WHCO, per NGA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI; (b)(5) per WHCO; (b)(7)(E)-4,-5,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-292	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per WHCO, per NGA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI; (b)(5) per WHCO; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-293	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per WHCO; (b)(3)-5 per FBI; (b)(5) per WHCO; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-294	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per WHCO, per NGA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI; (b)(5) per WHCO; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-295	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per WHCO, per NGA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI; (b)(5) per WHCO; (b)(7)(E)-4,-5,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-296	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per WHCO, per NGA, per DIA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per DIA; (b)(5) per WHCO; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-297	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per WHCO, per DIA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI, per DIA; (b)(5) per WHCO; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-298	(b)(1)-1 per FBI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI; (b)(6)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(C)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-5,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-299	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per DIA, DOS, NGA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI; (b)(7)(D)-5 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-5,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-300	(b)(1)-1 per FBI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI; (b)(6)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(C)-1 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-5,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-301 - FBI(24-cv-2684)-302	(b)(1)-1 per FBI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI; (b)(7)(E)-4,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-303 - FBI(24-cv-2684)-304	(b)(1)-1 per FBI, per DIA; (b)(3)-5 per FBI;(b)(7)(E)-4,-5,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-305	(b)(1)-1 per FBI; (b)(3)-5 per FBI;(b)(7)(E)-4,-5,-8 per FBI
FBI(24-cv-2684)-306 - FBI(24-cv-2684)-339	Duplicate

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X Deleted Page(s) X
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X For this Page X
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DECLASSIFIED BY [redacted]/NSICG
ON 7/31/2024

b6-1
b7C-1

[redacted] (FBI)

From: MYERS, M. A. (DO) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, August 25, 2021 4:16 PM
To: WRAY, CHRISTOPHER (DO) (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (DO) (OGA); ABBATE, PAUL (DO) (FBI); [redacted] (DO) (FBI)
Subject: FW: Updated NICA Draft and Information --- [redacted]

b6-1
b7C-1

b3-5 per ODNI,FBI
b7E-4,8

Classification: TOP SECRET//HCS-P/SI-G//ORCON/NOFORN/[redacted]

Classified By: [redacted]
Derived From: Multiple Sources
Declassify On: 20461231
==========

b6-1
b7C-1
b7E-2

Sir,

This version has the areas of interest highlighted by [redacted] and an explanation of next steps.

V/R,

--mo

From: [redacted] (FBI) [redacted]
Sent: Wednesday, August 25, 2021 11:34 AM
To: [redacted] (FBI) [redacted]; MYERS, M. A. (DO) (FBI) [redacted]; [redacted] (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (FBI) [redacted] (FBI) [redacted] (FBI) [redacted] (FBI) [redacted]
Subject: Updated NICA Draft and Information --- [redacted]

b6-1
b7C-1
b7E-2,3

b3 per ODNI

Classification: TOP SECRET//HCS-P/SI-G//ORCON/NOFORN/[redacted]

Classified By: [redacted]
Derived From: Multiple Sources
Declassify On: 20461231
==========

b3-5 per ODNI,FBI
b5-1
b6-1
b7C-1
b7E-2,4,8

[redacted]/EAD Myers/[redacted]

[redacted]

(U) (TS//[redacted])[redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) (TS/[redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U//~~FOUO~~) COVID-19 Pandemic Origins

(U) (TS/[redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) • (TS/[redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) [a] [b] (TS/[redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) [d] (TS/[redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) (S) (X[redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b6-1
b7C-1
b7E-4,8

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b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) • (TS//

b1-1
b3-5
b7D-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) • (TS//

b1-1
b3-5
b7D-5
b7E-4,5,8

•

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U//~~FOUO~~)

(U) (TS//

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

[i]

(U) • (S//[redacted]//~~OC-USGOV/NF~~)

b1-1
b3-5
b7D-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) • (S//~~NF~~)

b1-1
b3-5
b7D-5
b7E-4,5,8

[h]

[j]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,8

[redacted][26]

b1-1
b3-5
b7D-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) (S//~~NF~~) **Analysis of Alternatives:** [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) (S//~~NF~~) **Outlook:** [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) [redacted]

b7E-2,4,5,8

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,8

(U) Endnotes

[1] (U//~~FOUO~~) FBI | FD-1057 | [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b6-2
b7C-2
b7D-5
b7E-1,4,5,8

[2] (U//~~FOUO~~) FBI | FD-1057 | [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b6-2
b7C-2
b7D-5
b7E-1,4,5,8

(U) [3] (S//~~NF~~) FBI | FD-1057 | [redacted]

(U) SECRET//~~NOFORN~~ | [redacted]

(U) [4] (TS//[redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b6-3
b7C-3
b7D-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) [5] (TS//[redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7D-5
b7E-4,5,8

[6] (U) [redacted]

b7E-4

(U) [7] (TS//[redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b6-3
b7C-3
b7D-5
b7E-4,5,8

[8] (U//~~FOUO~~) FBI | FD-1057 | [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b6-2,4
b7C-2,4
b7D-5
b7E-1,4,5,8

[9] (U//~~FOUO~~) FBI | FD-1057 | [redacted].

b1-1
b3-5
b6-2,4
b7C-2,4
b7D-5
b7E-1,4,5,8

[10] (U//~~FOUO~~) FBI | FD-1057 | [redacted]

(U) [11] (TS//[redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) [12] (TS//[redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) [13] (TS// [redacted]
b1-1
b3-5
b7D-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) [14] (S//~~NF~~) FBI | IIR [redacted]
b1-1
b3-5
b7D-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) SECRET//~~NOFORN~~ | SECRET//~~NOFORN~~ | [redacted]

(U) [redacted].

(U) [15] (TS// [redacted]
b1-1
b3-5
b7D-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) [16] (S//~~NF~~) FBI | FD-1023 | [redacted]
b1-1
b3-5
b7D-5

(U) [redacted] SECRET//~~NOFORN~~ | SECRET//~~NOFORN~~ | [redacted]

(U) [redacted]

(U) [17] (TS// [redacted]
b7E-1,4,5,8

(U) [18] (TS// [redacted]
b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) [19] (TS// [redacted]
b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

[20] (U//~~FOUO~~) FBI | FD-1057 | [redacted]
b1-1
b3-5
b6-2
b7C-2
b7D-5
b7E-1,4,5,8

[redacted] SECRET//~~NOFORN~~.(U)

(U) [21] (TS// [redacted]

[22] (U//~~FOUO~~) FBI | FD-1057 | [redacted]
b1-1
b3-5
b6-2
b7C-2

[redacted].

(U) [23] (S//~~NF~~) FBI | FD-1023 | [redacted]
b7D-5
b7E-1,4,5,8

(U) SECRET//~~NOFORN~~ | SECRET//~~NOFORN~~. (U) (U)

(U) [24] (S// [redacted] //~~OC-USGOV/NF~~) [redacted] | [redacted] | SECRET// [redacted]
b1-1
b3-5
b6-2
b7C-2
b7D-5
b7E-1,4,5,8

(U) [redacted] //~~ORCON-USGOV/NOFORN~~ | SECRET// [redacted] //~~ORCON-USGOV/NOFORN~~

(U) [25] (S//~~NF~~) FBI | FD-1023 | [redacted]

(U) [redacted] SECRET//~~NOFORN~~ | SECRET//~~NOFORN~~ | [redacted]

(U) [redacted]

(U) [26] (S//~~NF~~) FBI | IIR [redacted]
b1-1
b3-5
b7D-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) SECRET//~~NOFORN~~ | SECRET//~~NOFORN~~ | [redacted]

(U)

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,8

b1-1
b3-5
b7D-5
b7E-4,5,8

[redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,8

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERER OTHERWISE
SHOWN

DATE 7/26/2024
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]
REASON: 1.4(C)
DECLASSIFY ON 12/31/2049

b1-1
b3-5
b6-1
b7C-1
b7E-4,8

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION TECHNICAL ANALYSIS BULLETIN

(U) (TS//[redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) [redacted]

15 JUNE 2021
FBI TAB [redacted]

b6-1
b7C-1
b7E-2,4,5,8

Classified by: [redacted]
Derived from: Multiple Sources
Declassify on: 50X1-HUM

(U) This document is classified: TOP SECRET//[redacted]
(U) Technical Analysis Bulletin template approved for fiscal year 2021, as of 1 October 2020.

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) [redacted]

(U) (TS//[redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7D-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) (TS//[redacted])

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

[a] [redacted].
[b] [redacted]
[c] [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) [d] (TS//[redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,8

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,8

[redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

SECRET//~~NOFORN~~

(U) Source Summary Statement

(U) (S//~~NF~~) [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7D-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) (TS//~~OC/NF~~ [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) (TS//[redacted])

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) (TS//[redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) • (TS//[redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

[e] (U//~~FOUO~~) *Analyst Note:* [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7D-5
b7E-4,5,8

[f] (U) *Analyst Note:* [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,8

b1-1
b3-5
b7D-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) • (S//~~NF~~) [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7D-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) (TS//[redacted]) [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7D-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) • (S//~~NF~~) [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) • (S//~~NF~~) [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) (S//~~NF~~) [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7D-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) • (S//~~NF~~) [redacted]

[redacted]

[g] (U) [redacted]

[h] (U) *Analyst Note*: [redacted]

[i] (U) *Analyst Note*: [redacted]

(U) [j] (S//~~NF~~) *Analyst Note*: [redacted]

[k] (U) *Analyst Note*: [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,8

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,8

[redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) • (S//NF) [redacted][14]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) (TS//[redacted]) [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) • (TS//[redacted]) [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7D-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) • (TS//[redacted]) [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b6-4
b7C-4
b7D-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) • (S//NF) [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7D-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) • (S//NF) [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7D-5
b7E-4,5,8

[l] (U) *Analyst Note*: [redacted]

[m] (U) See Appendix D: [redacted]

[n] (U) *Analyst Note*: [redacted]

[o] (U) See Appendix E: [redacted]

(U) [p] (TS//[redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7D-5
b7E-4,5,8

b1-1
b3-5
b7D-5
b7E-4,5,8

24-cv-2684(FBI)-273

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,8

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,8

(U) (S//~~NF~~) [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

- (U) [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) • (S//~~NF~~) [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7D-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) Perspective

(U) (TS//[redacted]) [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) (S//[redacted]//~~NF~~) [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

24-cv-2684(FBI)-274

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,8

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,8

(U) (TS//[redacted]) [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) Analysis of Alternatives

(U) (S//~~NF~~) [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) Outlook

(U) (S//~~NF~~) [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) [9] (TS//[redacted]) *Analyst Note*: Per the abovementioned [redacted], the USIC remains divided in its judgment of which transmission path is most probable, but nearly all agencies continue to judge the virus was not genetically engineered.

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

24-cv-2684(FBI)-275

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,8

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,8

(U) (S//~~NF~~) [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) [redacted]

b7E-2,3,4

(U) [redacted]

b7E-3,4

(U) [redacted]

b7E-3,4

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,8

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,8

(U) Endnotes

[1] (U) FBI | Case Information | [redacted] | "[TITLE REDACTED]" | UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ | SECRET//~~NOFORN~~. b7E-4

(U) [2] (S//~~NF~~) FBI | IIR [redacted] SECRET//~~NOFORN~~ | SECRET//~~NOFORN~~. b1-1 b3-5 b7E-4,5,8

(U) [3] (S//~~NF~~) FBI | IIR [redacted] | SECRET//~~NOFORN~~ | SECRET//~~NOFORN~~. b1-1 b3-5 b7E-4,5,8

(U) [4] (S//~~NF~~) FBI | IIR [redacted] SECRET//~~NOFORN~~ | SECRET//~~NOFORN~~.

(U) [5] (TS// [redacted] b1-1 b3-5 b7E-4,5,8

(U) [6] (TS// [redacted] b1-1 b3-5 b7E-4,5,8

(U) [7] (S//~~NF~~) FBI | IIR [redacted] | SECRET//~~NOFORN~~ | SECRET//~~NOFORN~~. b1-1 b3-5 b7E-4,5,8

[8] (U) [redacted] b7E-4

[9] (U) [redacted] b7E-4

(U) [10] (S//~~NF~~) FBI | IIR [redacted] | SECRET//~~NOFORN~~ | SECRET//~~NOFORN~~. b1-1 b3-5 b7E-4,5,8

[11] (U) FBI | Case Information | [redacted] | "[TITLE REDACTED]" | UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ | UNCLASSIFIED ~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~.

(U) [12] (S//~~NF~~) FBI | IIR [redacted] SECRET//~~NOFORN~~ | SECRET//~~NOFORN~~. b1-1 b3-5 b7E-4,5,8

(U) [13] (S//~~NF~~) FBI | IIR [redacted] SECRET//~~NOFORN~~ | SECRET//~~NOFORN~~. b1-1 b3-5 b7E-4,5,8

(U) [14] (S//~~NF~~) FBI | IIR [redacted] | SECRET//~~NOFORN~~ | SECRET//~~NOFORN~~.

(U) [15] (TS// [redacted] b1-1 b3-5 b7E-4,5,8

(U) [16] (S//~~NF~~) FBI | IIR [redacted] SECRET//~~NOFORN~~ | SECRET//~~NOFORN~~. b1-1 b3-5 b7E-4,5,8

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,8

(U) [17] (TS/[redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) [18] (S/~~NF~~) FBI | IIR | [redacted] | [redacted] SECRET//~~NOFORN~~ | SECRET//~~NOFORN~~.

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) [19] (S/~~NF~~) FBI | IIR | [redacted] | [redacted] SECRET//~~NOFORN~~ | SECRET//~~NOFORN~~.

[20] (U) [redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

[21] (U) FBI | Case Information | [redacted] | "[TITLE REDACTED]" | UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ | UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~.

(U) [22] (S/~~NF~~) FBI | IIR | [redacted] | [redacted] SECRET//~~NOFORN~~ | SECRET//~~NOFORN~~.

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

(U) [23] (TS/[redacted]

[24] (U) [redacted]

b7E-4

[25] (U) [redacted]

b7E-4

[26] (U) [redacted]

b7E-4

[27] (U) [redacted]

b7E-4

[28] (U) [redacted]

b7E-4

[29] (U) [redacted]

b7E-4

[30] (U) [redacted]

b7E-4

(U) [31] (TS/[redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

[32] (U) [redacted]

b7E-4

[33] (U) [redacted]

b7E-4

[34] (U) [redacted]

b7E-4

[35] (U) [redacted]

b7E-4

[36] (U) [redacted]

b7E-4

[37] (U) [redacted]

b7E-4

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,8

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,8

[38] (U) [redacted]

b7E-4

[39] (U) [redacted]

b7E-4

[40] (U) [redacted]

b7E-4

[41] (U) [redacted]

b7E-4

[42] (U) [redacted]

b7E-4

[43] (U) [redacted]

b7E-4

[redacted]

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,5,8

b1-1
b3-5
b7E-4,8